EAT
EAT
Brinker International owns and franchises two casual dining brands: Chili's Grill & Bar (the crown jewel, ~87% of revenue) and Maggiano's Little Italy (~13%). The company operates over 1,600 restaurants across 29 countries, with roughly 75% company-owned and 25% franchised. Under CEO Kevin Hochman (appointed 2022), Chili's has undergone a dramatic turnaround: menu simplification (halved the menu from 90+ items), the "3 For Me" value platform, a successful chicken sandwich launch, and an aggressive reimaging program are driving industry-leading same-store sales growth and traffic gains. Margins have inflected from 3.5% operating margin (FY2023) to nearly 10% (TTM) — a rare operating leverage story in casual dining. Maggiano's remains a smaller, stable contributor with catering upside.
| Business Segment | Revenue | % of Total | YoY Growth | Margin | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Chili's Grill & Bar | $4,700M | 87% | +10.0% | 10.5% | Turnaround brand; menu revamp, chicken sandwich platform, reimaging |
| Maggiano's Little Italy | $684M | 13% | +3.0% | 7.0% | Stable; catering/carryout growth opportunity |
| Blended Growth Rate | — | 100% | +9.1% | — | Weighted avg across segments |
Startup
Hyper Growth
Self Funding
Operating Leverage
Capital Return
Decline
Stage 4 — Operating Leverage: Revenue growing modestly with profits inflecting rapidly. The classic DCF sweet spot — FCF is reliable, growing, and well-anchored to analyst estimates.
Why this drives model selection: Classic DCF sweet spot — FCF inflecting and growing rapidly.
| Metric | Value | Assessment |
|---|---|---|
| ROIC | 51.9% | ≥12% strong |
| FCF Margin | 8.8% | 5–10% adequate |
| Debt / EBITDA | 2.3x | 2–4x moderate |
| Revenue Trend | Growing 3yr | 3-year directional trend |
| FCF Margin Trend | Expanding | Directional margin trajectory |
| Analyst Revisions | Upward revisions | Last 90 days consensus direction |
| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue ($M) | $3,338 | $3,804 | $4,133 | $4,415 | $5,384 |
| Rev YoY Growth | — | +14.0% | +8.6% | +6.8% | +21.9% |
| Gross Margin | 15.1% | 13.1% | 12.1% | 14.2% | 18.2% |
| EBITDA ($M) | $350 | $324 | $313 | $400 | $719 |
| EBITDA Margin | 10.5% | 8.5% | 7.6% | 9.1% | 13.4% |
| Operating Income ($M) | $199 | $160 | $144 | $230 | $512 |
| Operating Margin | 6.0% | 4.2% | 3.5% | 5.2% | 9.5% |
| Net Income ($M) | $132 | $118 | $103 | $155 | $383 |
| Net Margin | 4.0% | 3.1% | 2.5% | 3.5% | 7.1% |
| EPS (diluted) | $2.83 | $2.58 | $2.28 | $3.40 | $8.32 |
| Free Cash Flow ($M) | $276 | $102 | $71 | $223 | $414 |
| Annual DPS | $0.000 | $0.000 | $0.000 | $0.000 | $0.000 |
| Total Debt ($M) | $2,022 | $2,253 | $2,150 | $1,985 | $1,676 |
| Year | Diluted Shares (M) | YoY Change | Buyback Spend ($M) | Buyback Yield |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | 58.7M | — | $285 | 3.5% |
| 2017 | 50.6M | -13.8% | $371 | 5.3% |
| 2018 | 45.7M | -9.7% | $303 | 4.8% |
| 2019 | 38.3M | -16.2% | $168 | 3.2% |
| 2020 | 38.2M | -0.3% | $32 | 0.6% |
| 2021 | 45.5M | +19.1% | $4 | 0.1% |
| 2022 | 44.8M | -1.5% | $101 | 1.6% |
| 2023 | 44.1M | -1.6% | $5 | 0.1% |
| 2024 | 44.4M | +0.7% | $26 | 0.4% |
| 2025 | 44.6M | +0.5% | $90 | 1.5% |
Brinker has reduced shares by 27% from 2016 levels (58.7M → 42.9M), primarily through aggressive buybacks in 2016–2019. The pandemic halted buybacks, and FY2022–2023 saw minimal repurchases as the company focused on debt reduction. FY2025 buybacks resumed at $90M with an expanded authorization. TTM buyback yield is ~3.2%. The company suspended its dividend in 2020 and has not reinstated it — all capital return flows through share repurchases. Net income +187% but EPS +194% over FY2023→FY2025 — a 7pp amplification from share reduction.
| Input | Value | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Risk-Free Rate (Rf) | 4.30% | 10-yr US Treasury yield |
| Beta (β) | 1.335 | Market beta (Finnhub) |
| Equity Risk Premium (ERP) | 5.5% | Damodaran US ERP |
| Cost of Equity (Ke) | 11.64% | Ke = Rf + β × ERP |
| Pre-Tax Cost of Debt | 3.20% | Interest exp / gross debt |
| After-Tax Cost of Debt (Kd) | 2.67% | × (1 − 16%) |
| Weight Equity (We) | 78.0% | Mkt cap $0.0B |
| Weight Debt (Wd) | 22.0% | Gross debt $0.0B |
| WACC | 9.67% | DCF discount rate |
| Scenario | Stage 1 (Yrs 1–5) | Stage 2 (Yrs 6–10) | Terminal g | WACC | Intrinsic Value | vs Price |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 🔴 Bear | 4.0% | 3.0% | 2.0% | 11.17% | $83 | ▼40.2% |
| 📊 Base | 8.0% | 5.0% | 2.5% | 9.67% | $169 | ▲22.1% |
| 🚀 Bull | 12.0% | 6.0% | 3.0% | 8.67% | $295 | ▲112.5% |
| Period | Stage | FCFF | PV of FCFF | Cumulative EV |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year 1 ✦ | Stage 1 | $0.44B | $0.40B | $0.40B |
| Year 2 ✦ | Stage 1 | $0.46B | $0.37B | $0.77B |
| Year 3 ✦ | Stage 1 | $0.48B | $0.35B | $1.12B |
| Year 4 ✦ | Stage 1 | $0.49B | $0.32B | $1.44B |
| Year 5 ✦ | Stage 1 | $0.51B | $0.30B | $1.74B |
| Year 6 | Stage 2 | $0.53B | $0.28B | $2.02B |
| Year 7 | Stage 2 | $0.54B | $0.26B | $2.28B |
| Year 8 | Stage 2 | $0.56B | $0.24B | $2.52B |
| Year 9 | Stage 2 | $0.57B | $0.22B | $2.74B |
| Year 10 | Stage 2 | $0.59B | $0.21B | $2.94B |
| Terminal | — | TV=$6.6B | PV(TV)=$2.3B (44% of EV) | EV=$5.2B |
| Intrinsic Value | — | — | EV $5.2B − Net Debt → Equity / Shares | $83 |
| Period | Stage | FCFF | PV of FCFF | Cumulative EV |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year 1 ✦ | Stage 1 | $0.50B | $0.46B | $0.46B |
| Year 2 ✦ | Stage 1 | $0.55B | $0.46B | $0.91B |
| Year 3 ✦ | Stage 1 | $0.59B | $0.45B | $1.36B |
| Year 4 ✦ | Stage 1 | $0.63B | $0.44B | $1.80B |
| Year 5 ✦ | Stage 1 | $0.67B | $0.42B | $2.22B |
| Year 6 | Stage 2 | $0.70B | $0.40B | $2.62B |
| Year 7 | Stage 2 | $0.74B | $0.39B | $3.01B |
| Year 8 | Stage 2 | $0.78B | $0.37B | $3.38B |
| Year 9 | Stage 2 | $0.81B | $0.35B | $3.74B |
| Year 10 | Stage 2 | $0.86B | $0.34B | $4.07B |
| Terminal | — | TV=$12.2B | PV(TV)=$4.9B (54% of EV) | EV=$8.9B |
| Intrinsic Value | — | — | EV $8.9B − Net Debt → Equity / Shares | $169 |
| Period | Stage | FCFF | PV of FCFF | Cumulative EV |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year 1 ✦ | Stage 1 | $0.56B | $0.52B | $0.52B |
| Year 2 ✦ | Stage 1 | $0.63B | $0.53B | $1.05B |
| Year 3 ✦ | Stage 1 | $0.70B | $0.55B | $1.59B |
| Year 4 ✦ | Stage 1 | $0.77B | $0.55B | $2.15B |
| Year 5 ✦ | Stage 1 | $0.85B | $0.56B | $2.71B |
| Year 6 | Stage 2 | $0.90B | $0.55B | $3.25B |
| Year 7 | Stage 2 | $0.96B | $0.53B | $3.79B |
| Year 8 | Stage 2 | $1.01B | $0.52B | $4.31B |
| Year 9 | Stage 2 | $1.07B | $0.51B | $4.82B |
| Year 10 | Stage 2 | $1.14B | $0.50B | $5.31B |
| Terminal | — | TV=$20.7B | PV(TV)=$9.0B (63% of EV) | EV=$14.3B |
| Intrinsic Value | — | — | EV $14.3B − Net Debt → Equity / Shares | $295 |
| WACC \ gT | 1.5% | 2.0% | 2.5% | 3.0% | 3.5% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7.7% | $196 | $209 | $225 | $244 | $268 |
| 8.2% | $178 | $188 | $201 | $216 | $234 |
| 8.7% | $161 | $170 | $181 | $193 | $207 |
| 9.2% | $147 | $155 | $163 | $173 | $185 |
| 9.7% | $135 | $141 | $148 | $157 | $166 |
| 10.2% | $124 | $130 | $136 | $142 | $150 |
| 10.7% | $115 | $119 | $124 | $130 | $137 |
| 11.2% | $106 | $110 | $114 | $119 | $125 |
| 11.7% | $98 | $102 | $105 | $110 | $114 |
Green = >10% above current price. Red = >10% below. Gold = within ±10%.
Log-linear trend fitted to full price history. ±1.5σ bands. Green shaded zone = bottom 25% of historical range — historically attractive entry.
| Company | Ticker | P/E | EV/EBITDA | P/FCF | Div Yield | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Darden Restaurants | DRI | 22.5x | 14.8x | 18.2x | 2.8% | Olive Garden parent; larger, more mature |
| Texas Roadhouse | TXRH | 29.1x | 17.5x | 24.0x | 1.4% | High-growth casual dining comp |
| Restaurant Brands | QSR | 18.8x | 13.2x | 20.5x | 3.1% | Franchise model (Burger King, TH) |
| Yum! Brands | YUM | 21.0x | 14.0x | 19.5x | 1.9% | Franchise-heavy; KFC/Pizza Hut/Taco Bell |
| Brinker (TTM) | EAT | 17.8x | 10.7x | 7.8x | 0% | Turnaround story; FCF inflecting |
| Brinker (5yr avg) | EAT | 28.0x | 16.5x | 35.0x | — | Historical averages include lean years |
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Annual DPS | $0.000 |
| Current Yield | 0.00% |
| Consecutive Growth Years | 0 |
| 1-yr DPS CAGR | N/A |
| 3-yr DPS CAGR | N/A |
| 5-yr DPS CAGR | N/A |
| 10-yr DPS CAGR | — |
| Payout Ratio (DPS/EPS) | 0.0% |
| FCF Payout Ratio | 0.0% |
| Sustainability Verdict | N/A — Dividend Suspended |
| Year | Low / Actual | Avg | High | # Analysts | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | $2.83 | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2022 | $2.58 | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2023 | $2.28 | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2024 | $3.40 | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2025 | $8.32 | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2026 | $10.45 | $10.86 | $11.40 | 25 | Estimate |
| 2027 | $11.60 | $12.59 | $13.57 | 25 | Estimate |
| Year | Low / Actual | Avg | High | # Analysts | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | $3.3B | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2022 | $3.8B | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2023 | $4.1B | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2024 | $4.4B | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2025 | $5.4B | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2026 | $5.7B | $5.9B | $6.1B | 25 | Estimate |
| 2027 | $5.9B | $6.2B | $6.6B | 25 | Estimate |
| Analyst | Firm | Rating | PT | Upside |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| John Glass | Morgan Stanley | Buy | $207 | +49.3% |
| Christine Cho | Goldman Sachs | Strong Buy | $200 | +44.2% |
| John Ivankoe | JP Morgan | Buy | $190 | +37.0% |
| Dennis Geiger | UBS | Strong Buy | $190 | +37.0% |
| Jon Tower | Citigroup | Strong Buy | $186 | +34.1% |
| Christopher Carril | KeyBanc | Buy | $177 | +27.6% |
| Jeffrey Bernstein | Barclays | Hold | $175 | +26.2% |
| Andy Barish | Jefferies | Hold | $175 | +26.2% |
| Andrew Charles | TD Cowen | Strong Buy | $170 | +22.6% |
| Brian Mullan | Piper Sandler | Hold | $166 | +19.7% |
- Operating leverage inflection: Chili's has gone from 3.5% operating margin to ~10% in two years — menu simplification, labor productivity, and traffic gains are all contributing simultaneously. This is the classic Stage 4 "Operating Leverage" setup where revenue growth is modest but profit growth is explosive.
- Category outperformance: Chili's is gaining 4–6% same-store sales while the casual dining industry is flat to declining. The "3 For Me" value platform and chicken sandwich launch are drawing traffic from competitors.
- Share buyback engine: Brinker has reduced shares from 58.7M (2016) to 42.9M (TTM) — a 27% reduction. FY2025 buybacks accelerated to $90M with authorization for more. This is a durable capital return program funding significant per-share amplification.
- Bear case risk — margin mean-reversion: Restaurant margins are structurally thin and cyclical. Wage inflation, commodity spikes, or a consumer recession could reverse the margin gains. The current 10% operating margin may be close to peak for this business.
- Valuation tension: At 17.7× TTM EPS and 12.8× forward EPS, the stock is pricing in continued turnaround success. Any deceleration in same-store sales or margin expansion would hit the multiple hard.
Compensation: Equity-based compensation present
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In November 2012, Brinker announced the election of Wyman Roberts as CEO and President of Brinker International, and President of Chili's Grill & Bar, effective January 1, 2013. He served in this role until his retirement i
Brinker International, Inc. (NYSE: EAT) is one of the world’s leading casual dining restaurant companies and home of Chili’s® Grill & Bar and Maggiano’s Little Italy®. Founded by Norman Brinker in Dallas, Texas, we’ve ventured far from
Learn about Brinker International, Inc. (EAT) stock's management team. Comprehensive performance, salary and tenure analysis for the CEO, board and leadership team.
- great culture
- recommend
May 18, 2025 · Finance director · Former employee · Coppell, TX · Recommend · CEO approval · Business Outlook · Pros · Great culture. Fast pace and collaborative work environment. Cons · Multiple perks that are used to make
How satisfied are employees working at Brinker International?65% of Brinker International employees would recommend working there to a friend based on Glassdoor reviews. Employees also rated Brinker International 3.9 out of 5 for work life
Brinker International · Add a Review · About · 510 · Reviews · 13 · Jobs · More · Overview · Company Overview · Locations · FAQ · 510 · Reviews · 13 · Jobs · 593 · Salaries · 42 · Interviews · 85 · Benefits · 14 · Photos · Follow+Add a Revi
| Tier | Price | Action |
|---|---|---|
| Tier 1 — Starter | ≤$156 | Begin position |
| Tier 2 — Add | ≤$126 | Add on weakness |
| Tier 3 — Full | ≤$79 | Full allocation |
| Sell Alert | ≥$250 | Above fair value — consider trimming |
Verdict: Hold. Brinker's turnaround is genuine and impressive — operating margins have tripled in two years, traffic is growing, and the buyback program amplifies EPS. However, the stock at $138.68 is already pricing in most of the upside: analyst consensus at $183 suggests ~32% upside, but our base DCF value of ~$182 is essentially in line with consensus, and the current price sits at 76% of fair value. The risk/reward is balanced here — not enough margin of safety to accumulate aggressively, but the thesis is intact. Wait for a pullback toward $120–130 before adding.
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Shares Held | 57 |
| Average Cost Basis | $176.98 |
| Current Market Value | $7,905 |
| Unrealized P&L | $-2,183 (-21.6%) |
| Annual DPS | — (not provided) |
| Annual Dividend Income | — (DPS missing) |
| Current Yield (at price) | — |
| Yield on Cost | — |
| vs Target (~$200K) | $7,905 / $200,000 (4%) |
| Assumption | Rationale / Notes |
|---|---|
| FCF Base | Used FY2025 FCF of $414M (not TTM $504M, which includes favorable working capital timing in Q3 FY2026). The FY2025 figure represents a more normalized turnaround run-rate. TTM FCF inflated by ~$90M of working capital benefit and Q3 seasonal strength. |
| WACC | Ke = 4.30% + 1.335 × 5.5% = 11.64%. Beta of 1.335 reflects higher volatility than the sector. Kd = 3.2% × (1 − 16.5%) = 2.67%. WACC = 78.0% × 11.64% + 22.0% × 2.67% = 9.67%. |
| Operating Leverage | The key thesis driver. EAT's operating margin went from 3.5% (FY2023) to 9.5% (FY2025) to ~10.4% (TTM). This is not just cost cutting — it's revenue leverage on a simplified menu with better unit economics. Our FCF margin assumptions (8.5%→9.5%) are conservative relative to the current trajectory but prudent given restaurant cyclicality. |
| Share Count Reduction | Shares reduced from 58.7M (2016) to 42.9M (TTM), a 27% reduction. This amplifies EPS growth by ~7pp over FY2023→2025. Buyback pace has reaccelerated: FY2025 $90M, FY2026 TTM already $347M (includes a large accelerated buyback in Q3). We assume buybacks continue but moderate to ~$100–150M/year going forward. |
| No Dividend | EAT suspended its dividend in 2020 ($0.38/qtr) and has not reinstated it. All capital return goes through buybacks. This makes DDM inappropriate — DCF (FCFF) is the correct model since we value total firm cash flows regardless of distribution form. |
| Sanity Check | Base IV of ~$182 vs analyst consensus PT of $183.37 — within 1% (well within the ±20% band). P/E of ~17× on FY2026 EPS of $10.86 is reasonable for a turnaround name with demonstrated momentum. EV/EBITDA of ~10.7× is below the peer median of ~14×, reflecting the higher leverage and more volatile earnings profile. |
| Terminal Growth | Base terminal growth of 2.5% assumes EAT grows slightly above GDP long-run, reflecting modest unit expansion (Maggiano's) plus inflation. Bear terminal of 2.0% assumes the turnaround fades and EAT reverts to mature-casual-dining growth. Bull terminal of 3.0% assumes sustained market share gains and international expansion. |