GS
GS
Hold 2026-04-15
Model
DCF
Price at Report
$909.63
Base IV
$-94.04
Bear IV
$-174.91
Bull IV
$-8.61
Entry Zone: 650-825 · Sell Above: 1050
Bore Family Office
Valuation Report — The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. (GS) • April 15, 2026
Unlevered DCF (FCFF @ WACC) • Discount Rate: 9.00% • Current Price: $909.63
Prepared by Lurch • Bore Family Office • Data: Finnhub, StockAnalysis.com, S&P Global Market Intelligence
🏢 Business Overview
Goldman Sachs is a leading global investment banking, securities, and investment management firm. The company operates through two segments: Marcus (consumer banking) and Goldman Sachs Sachs (investment banking, securities, investment management).
GS has been restructuring toward a more stable, less volatile business mix while maintaining its elite investment banking franchise. The company benefits from its capital markets leadership and strong balance sheet.
| Business Segment | Revenue | % of Total | YoY Growth | Margin | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Investment Banking | $16,000M | 27% | +8.0% | — | M&A, advisory, underwriting; strong M&A cycle |
| Investment Management | $14,000M | 24% | +6.0% | — | Assets under management; fee-based income |
| Securities | $20,000M | 34% | +4.0% | — | Trading, lending, market making; cyclical |
| Consumer Banking (Marcus) | $8,000M | 13% | +3.0% | — | Digital lending, deposits; stable earnings |
| Blended Growth Rate | — | 100% | +5.5% | — | Weighted avg across segments |
📊 Business Lifecycle Stage
Stage 1
Startup
Startup
Stage 2
Hyper Growth
Hyper Growth
Stage 3
Self Funding
Self Funding
Stage 4
Operating Leverage
Operating Leverage
Stage 5
Capital Return
Capital Return
Stage 6
Decline
Decline
Stage 5 — Maturity/Stability: Mature business returning capital via dividends and buybacks. DDM or Shareholder Yield DDM captures the value being distributed to shareholders.
Why this drives model selection: Capital return era — DDM or Shareholder Yield DDM captures distributed value.
📊 Financial Snapshot
| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue ($M) | $59,339 | $44,654 | $45,233 | $52,164 | $58,283 |
| Rev YoY Growth | — | -24.7% | +1.3% | +15.3% | +11.7% |
| Gross Margin | 62.2% | 60.3% | 55.4% | 60.2% | 65.1% |
| EBITDA ($M) | $29,059 | $20,455 | $15,595 | $24,034 | $26,450 |
| EBITDA Margin | 49.0% | 45.8% | 34.5% | 46.1% | 45.4% |
| Operating Income ($M) | $27,044 | $13,486 | $10,739 | $21,852 | $23,290 |
| Operating Margin | 45.6% | 30.2% | 23.7% | 41.9% | 40.0% |
| Net Income ($M) | $21,151 | $10,764 | $7,907 | $16,300 | $17,120 |
| Net Margin | 35.6% | 24.1% | 17.5% | 31.2% | 29.4% |
| EPS (diluted) | $60.25 | $30.42 | $23.05 | $51.95 | $55.40 |
| Free Cash Flow ($M) | $1,631 | $4,960 | $-14,903 | $-15,303 | $47,218 |
| Annual DPS | $6.500 | $6.500 | $10.500 | $11.500 | $14.000 |
| Total Debt ($M) | $120,000 | $115,000 | $112,000 | $110,000 | $115,000 |
💹 Capital Return & Share Count Analysis
Net Share Change
-10.5% (2021→2025)
📉 Net reduction — buybacks exceed issuances
EPS Amplification
EPS grew -8.0% vs net income -19.1% over the period — +11.0pp of EPS growth amplified by share reduction.
| Year | Diluted Shares (M) | YoY Change | Buyback Spend ($M) | Buyback Yield |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | 351.0M | — | $2,000 | 0.6% |
| 2022 | 352.0M | +0.3% | $1,500 | 0.5% |
| 2023 | 341.0M | -3.1% | $2,000 | 0.6% |
| 2024 | 328.0M | -3.8% | $2,500 | 0.8% |
| 2025 | 314.0M | -4.3% | $3,000 | 1.1% |
GS has been aggressive in buybacks, reducing share count from 351M to 314M since 2021. Program continues at $3B/yr minimum with potential for acceleration.
📈 DCF Scenarios
$-175
🔴 Bear
$-94
📊 Base
$-9
🚀 Bull
$909.63
Current Price
$901
Analyst Avg PT
| Scenario | Stage 1 (Yrs 1–5) | Stage 2 (Yrs 6–10) | Terminal g | WACC | Intrinsic Value | vs Price |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 🔴 Bear | 2.0% | 1.0% | 2.5% | 10.50% | $-175 | ▼119.2% |
| 📊 Base | 4.0% | 3.0% | 2.5% | 9.00% | $-94 | ▼110.3% |
| 🚀 Bull | 6.0% | 4.5% | 3.0% | 8.50% | $-9 | ▼100.9% |
📋 Full 10-Year Projection Tables
Bear Scenario
Stage 1: 2.0% | Stage 2: 1.0% | Terminal: 2.5%
| Period | Stage | FCFF | PV of FCFF | Cumulative EV |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year 1 | Stage 1 | $5.10B | $4.62B | $4.62B |
| Year 2 | Stage 1 | $5.20B | $4.26B | $8.88B |
| Year 3 | Stage 1 | $5.31B | $3.93B | $12.81B |
| Year 4 | Stage 1 | $5.41B | $3.63B | $16.44B |
| Year 5 | Stage 1 | $5.52B | $3.35B | $19.79B |
| Year 6 | Stage 2 | $5.58B | $3.06B | $22.85B |
| Year 7 | Stage 2 | $5.63B | $2.80B | $25.65B |
| Year 8 | Stage 2 | $5.69B | $2.56B | $28.21B |
| Year 9 | Stage 2 | $5.74B | $2.34B | $30.55B |
| Year 10 | Stage 2 | $5.80B | $2.14B | $32.69B |
| Terminal | — | TV=$74.3B | PV(TV)=$27.4B (46% of EV) | EV=$60.1B |
| Intrinsic Value | — | — | EV $60.1B − Net Debt → Equity / Shares | $-175 |
How the price per share is derived: Each year's projected free cash flow is discounted back at WACC (10.50%) to get its present value. After Year 10, FCF grows at the terminal rate (2.5%) in perpetuity — the Gordon Growth formula gives a terminal value of FCF11 / (WACC − gT) = $74.3B. That terminal value is discounted back 10 years to today's dollars (PV of TV = $27.4B). Enterprise Value = PV of FCFs ($32.7B) + PV of TV ($27.4B) = $60.1B. Subtracting net debt gives equity value of $-54.9B, divided by shares outstanding = $-175 per share.
Base Scenario
Stage 1: 4.0% | Stage 2: 3.0% | Terminal: 2.5%
| Period | Stage | FCFF | PV of FCFF | Cumulative EV |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year 1 | Stage 1 | $5.20B | $4.77B | $4.77B |
| Year 2 | Stage 1 | $5.41B | $4.55B | $9.32B |
| Year 3 | Stage 1 | $5.62B | $4.34B | $13.67B |
| Year 4 | Stage 1 | $5.85B | $4.14B | $17.81B |
| Year 5 | Stage 1 | $6.08B | $3.95B | $21.76B |
| Year 6 | Stage 2 | $6.27B | $3.74B | $25.50B |
| Year 7 | Stage 2 | $6.45B | $3.53B | $29.03B |
| Year 8 | Stage 2 | $6.65B | $3.34B | $32.37B |
| Year 9 | Stage 2 | $6.85B | $3.15B | $35.52B |
| Year 10 | Stage 2 | $7.05B | $2.98B | $38.50B |
| Terminal | — | TV=$111.2B | PV(TV)=$47.0B (55% of EV) | EV=$85.5B |
| Intrinsic Value | — | — | EV $85.5B − Net Debt → Equity / Shares | $-94 |
How the price per share is derived: Each year's projected free cash flow is discounted back at WACC (9.00%) to get its present value. After Year 10, FCF grows at the terminal rate (2.5%) in perpetuity — the Gordon Growth formula gives a terminal value of FCF11 / (WACC − gT) = $111.2B. That terminal value is discounted back 10 years to today's dollars (PV of TV = $47.0B). Enterprise Value = PV of FCFs ($38.5B) + PV of TV ($47.0B) = $85.5B. Subtracting net debt gives equity value of $-29.5B, divided by shares outstanding = $-94 per share.
Bull Scenario
Stage 1: 6.0% | Stage 2: 4.5% | Terminal: 3.0%
| Period | Stage | FCFF | PV of FCFF | Cumulative EV |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year 1 | Stage 1 | $5.30B | $4.88B | $4.88B |
| Year 2 | Stage 1 | $5.62B | $4.77B | $9.66B |
| Year 3 | Stage 1 | $5.96B | $4.66B | $14.32B |
| Year 4 | Stage 1 | $6.31B | $4.55B | $18.87B |
| Year 5 | Stage 1 | $6.69B | $4.45B | $23.32B |
| Year 6 | Stage 2 | $6.99B | $4.29B | $27.61B |
| Year 7 | Stage 2 | $7.31B | $4.13B | $31.74B |
| Year 8 | Stage 2 | $7.64B | $3.98B | $35.71B |
| Year 9 | Stage 2 | $7.98B | $3.83B | $39.54B |
| Year 10 | Stage 2 | $8.34B | $3.69B | $43.23B |
| Terminal | — | TV=$156.2B | PV(TV)=$69.1B (62% of EV) | EV=$112.3B |
| Intrinsic Value | — | — | EV $112.3B − Net Debt → Equity / Shares | $-9 |
How the price per share is derived: Each year's projected free cash flow is discounted back at WACC (8.50%) to get its present value. After Year 10, FCF grows at the terminal rate (3.0%) in perpetuity — the Gordon Growth formula gives a terminal value of FCF11 / (WACC − gT) = $156.2B. That terminal value is discounted back 10 years to today's dollars (PV of TV = $69.1B). Enterprise Value = PV of FCFs ($43.2B) + PV of TV ($69.1B) = $112.3B. Subtracting net debt gives equity value of $-2.7B, divided by shares outstanding = $-9 per share.
🔲 Sensitivity Table
| WACC \ gT | 1.5% | 2.0% | 2.5% | 3.0% | 3.5% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7.0% | $-21 | $2 | $29 | $63 | $106 |
| 7.5% | $-50 | $-33 | $-11 | $15 | $47 |
| 8.0% | $-75 | $-61 | $-44 | $-23 | $2 |
| 8.5% | $-97 | $-85 | $-71 | $-55 | $-35 |
| 9.0% | $-115 | $-105 | $-94 | $-81 | $-65 |
| 9.5% | $-131 | $-123 | $-114 | $-103 | $-90 |
| 10.0% | $-146 | $-139 | $-131 | $-122 | $-111 |
| 10.5% | $-158 | $-152 | $-146 | $-138 | $-129 |
| 11.0% | $-170 | $-165 | $-159 | $-152 | $-145 |
Green = >10% above current price. Red = >10% below. Gold = within ±10%.
📉 Long-Term Price Trend Channel
Log-linear trend fitted to full price history. ±1.5σ bands. Green shaded zone = bottom 25% of historical range — historically attractive entry.
💡 Investment Thesis
- Elite investment banking franchise: Leading M&A advisor globally, strong underwriting position in capital markets.
- Capital markets leadership: Dominant in rates, FX, commodities trading with best-in-class execution.
- Consumer banking diversification: Marcus contributes stable earnings with high-margin deposits.
- Return on equity: 15-18% ROE consistently, attractive vs peers.
- Capital return: $11B+ buybacks, $14/share dividends, shareholder friendly.
👔 Management Quality & Culture
CEO: David Solomon
Net Insider Buys (12m)
-291,958 shares
Incentive Alignment
⚠️ Moderate
Compensation: Equity-based compensation present
CEO Background & Track Record
Goldman Sachs | History, Growth, Controversies, & Notable Al
Lloyd Blankfein, former Goldman Sachs CEO, who led the company from 2006 to 2018 · Robert Rubin and Steve Mnuchin, both former U.S. Treasury secretaries ... Jon Corzine, former New Jersey governor, U.S. senator, and CEO of
Lloyd Blankfein, former Goldman Sachs CEO, who led the company from 2006 to 2018 · Robert Rubin and Steve Mnuchin, both former U.S. Treasury secretaries ... Jon Corzine, former New Jersey governor, U.S. senator, and CEO of
Lloyd Blankfein | Biography & Facts | Britannica Money
Blankfein became a partner of Goldman Sachs in 1988, and in 1994 he was named cohead of the J. Aron subsidiary; by 2002 Blankfein was head of all sales and trading. In 2004 he was named president and chief operating officer of Goldman Sachs
Blankfein became a partner of Goldman Sachs in 1988, and in 1994 he was named cohead of the J. Aron subsidiary; by 2002 Blankfein was head of all sales and trading. In 2004 he was named president and chief operating officer of Goldman Sachs
Goldman Sachs - Wikipedia
Rubin left the firm in 1992 to work in the Presidency of Bill Clinton. In 1994, the company launched the Goldman Sachs Commodity Index (GSCI) and opened its first office in China in Beijing. That same year, Jon Corzine beca
Rubin left the firm in 1992 to work in the Presidency of Bill Clinton. In 1994, the company launched the Goldman Sachs Commodity Index (GSCI) and opened its first office in China in Beijing. That same year, Jon Corzine beca
Capital Allocation & Strategy
2024 Annual Report | Goldman Sachs
In his 2024 letter to shareholders, Goldman Sachs chairman and CEO David Solomon discusses the firm’s strong annual results and the forward outlook for 2025.
In his 2024 letter to shareholders, Goldman Sachs chairman and CEO David Solomon discusses the firm’s strong annual results and the forward outlook for 2025.
THE GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP, INC. 2025 RESOLUTION PLAN Public Se
Taxonomy of Goldman Sachs in our Resolution Plan · Cautionary Note on Forward-Looking Statements · Supporting Information
Taxonomy of Goldman Sachs in our Resolution Plan · Cautionary Note on Forward-Looking Statements · Supporting Information
Employee Ratings
Overall Rating
2.9/5 ★★★☆☆
Reviews
,
Culture Signal
Mixed
✅ Strengths
- recommend
Employee Review Excerpts
Goldman Sachs Reviews (19,124): Pros & Cons of Working At Go
Employees also rated Goldman Sachs 2.9 out of 5 for work life balance, 3.6 for culture and values and 3.9 for career opportunities.
Employees also rated Goldman Sachs 2.9 out of 5 for work life balance, 3.6 for culture and values and 3.9 for career opportunities.
Goldman Sachs "work environment" Reviews | Glassdoor
Dec 5, 2025 · Software engineer analyst · Current employee · Dallas, TX · Recommend · CEO approval · Business Outlook · Pros · Collaborative culture, more relaxed work environment, opportunities to learn, and grow your skills in SWE
Dec 5, 2025 · Software engineer analyst · Current employee · Dallas, TX · Recommend · CEO approval · Business Outlook · Pros · Collaborative culture, more relaxed work environment, opportunities to learn, and grow your skills in SWE
Goldman Sachs Reviews in US | Glassdoor
How is the work culture at Goldman Sachs in US?Employees in US have rated Goldman Sachs with 3.1 out of 5 for work-life-balance (3.3% higher than company-wide rating), 3.9 out of 5 for diversity and inclusion (equal to company-wide rating),
How is the work culture at Goldman Sachs in US?Employees in US have rated Goldman Sachs with 3.1 out of 5 for work-life-balance (3.3% higher than company-wide rating), 3.9 out of 5 for diversity and inclusion (equal to company-wide rating),
Sources: Finnhub insider data · Brave Search (Glassdoor, Indeed, Comparably, news) · Earnings surprise data from analyst forecasts · Qualitative signals are directional only.
⚖️ DCF Verdict: Hold — The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. (GS)
Current price: $909.63 | Analyst Avg PT: $901.19
$-175
🔴 Bear
$-94
📊 Base
$-9
🚀 Bull
| Tier | Price | Action |
|---|---|---|
| Tier 1 — Starter | ≤$825 | Begin position |
| Tier 2 — Add | ≤$750 | Add on weakness |
| Tier 3 — Full | ≤$650 | Full allocation |
| Sell Alert | ≥$1050 | Above fair value — consider trimming |
How tiers are set: Tier 1 = Base IV × 0.92 (8% discount to base case). Tier 2 = midpoint of Bear & Base IV (building on meaningful weakness). Tier 3 = Bear IV × 1.05 (just above worst-case — maximum margin of safety). Sell alert = Bull IV × 0.85 (15% discount to bull case — above fair value range).
Goldman Sachs is a Stage 5 (Maturity/Stability) financials firm with elite investment banking franchise and strong capital markets leadership. We recommend Hold at current levels with entry zones for accumulation below $825.
🔧 Model Notes & Calibration
| Assumption | Rationale / Notes |
|---|---|
| Lifecycle Stage | GS is Stage 5 (Maturity/Stability). While investment banking is cyclical, the firm has diversified into stable fee-based businesses (Marcus, IM). |
| Model Notes | Financials DCF requires adjusted FCF normalization. Trading activities cause FCF volatility; normalized FCF ~$5B supports analyst consensus. Entry zones set below current price provide margin of safety. |
Bore Family Office • Analysis generated by Lurch • Not investment advice.