LCID
LCID
Avoid 2026-05-10
Model
DCF
Price at Report
$6.34
Base IV
$7.19
Bear IV
$-18.16
Bull IV
$28.14
Entry Zone: 2-4 · Sell Above: 10
Bore Family Office
Valuation Report — Lucid Group, Inc. (LCID) • May 10, 2026
DCF w/ Exit Multiple (FCFF @ WACC) • Discount Rate: 12.50% • Current Price: $6.34
Prepared by Lurch • Bore Family Office • Data: Finnhub, StockAnalysis.com, S&P Global Market Intelligence
🏢 Business Overview
Lucid Group, Inc. (NASDAQ: LCID) is a vertically integrated EV technology company designing and manufacturing luxury electric vehicles at its factories in Arizona and Saudi Arabia. The company produces the Lucid Air luxury sedan and the Gravity SUV, with a Midsize vehicle and robotaxi program in development. Revenue reached $1.35B in FY2025 (+68% YoY), but the company remains deeply unprofitable with -$3.5B operating losses and -$3.8B in negative FCF. Saudi Arabia's Public Investment Fund (PIF) owns a controlling stake and has provided ~$10B in cumulative funding. In April 2026, Lucid raised an additional $1.05B in capital (convertible preferred + common + Uber investment) and expanded its DDTL by $500M.
Production guidance for 2026 is 25,000–27,000 units. Q1 2026 produced 5,500 vehicles (+149% YoY) but delivered only 3,093 due to a February supplier disruption. The company's robotaxi partnership with Uber targets 35,000+ vehicles. New CEO Silvio Napoli (announced April 2026) replaces interim CEO Marc Winterhoff, with a mandate to accelerate toward financial self-sufficiency.
| Business Segment | Revenue | % of Total | YoY Growth | Margin | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lucid Air (Sedan) | $1,050M | 78% | +40.0% | — | Flagship luxury EV sedan |
| Lucid Gravity (SUV) | $250M | 18% | — | — | Launched Q4 2024; ramping |
| Other / Services | $54M | 4% | +10.0% | — | Service, parts, regulatory credits |
| Blended Growth Rate | — | 100% | +38.5% | — | Weighted avg across segments |
📊 Business Lifecycle Stage
Stage 1
Startup
Startup
Stage 2
Hyper Growth
Hyper Growth
Stage 3
Self Funding
Self Funding
Stage 4
Operating Leverage
Operating Leverage
Stage 5
Capital Return
Capital Return
Stage 6
Decline
Decline
Stage 2 — Hyper Growth: Rapidly scaling revenue with losses near peak. Terminal value dominates the DCF — use wide Bear/Base/Bull scenarios with high sensitivity to assumptions.
Why this drives model selection: Losses peaking — DCF with very wide scenarios; terminal value dominates.
🔍 Quality Scorecard
| Metric | Value | Assessment |
|---|---|---|
| ROIC | -37.3% | <8% weak |
| FCF Margin | -331.8% | <5% weak |
| Revenue Trend | Growing 3yr | 3-year directional trend |
| FCF Margin Trend | Contracting | Directional margin trajectory |
| Analyst Revisions | Downward revisions | Last 90 days consensus direction |
⚠️ Elevated value trap risk — verify thesis before acting
📊 Financial Snapshot
| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue ($M) | $27 | $608 | $595 | $808 | $1,354 |
| Rev YoY Growth | — | +2151.9% | -2.1% | +35.8% | +67.6% |
| Gross Margin | -474.1% | -170.7% | -225.4% | -114.2% | -92.8% |
| EBITDA ($M) | $-1,468 | $-2,407 | $-2,866 | $-2,725 | $-3,051 |
| EBITDA Margin | -5437.0% | -395.9% | -481.7% | -337.3% | -225.3% |
| Operating Income ($M) | $-1,530 | $-2,594 | $-3,100 | $-3,021 | $-3,502 |
| Operating Margin | -5666.7% | -426.6% | -521.0% | -373.9% | -258.6% |
| Net Income ($M) | $-4,747 | $-1,304 | $-2,828 | $-2,714 | $-2,698 |
| Net Margin | -17581.5% | -214.5% | -475.3% | -335.9% | -199.3% |
| EPS (diluted) | $-64.10 | $-15.10 | $-13.59 | $-12.52 | $-11.81 |
| Free Cash Flow ($M) | $-1,479 | $-3,301 | $-3,400 | $-2,904 | $-3,800 |
| Annual DPS | $0.000 | $0.000 | $0.000 | $0.000 | $0.000 |
| Total Debt ($M) | $1,987 | $2,083 | $2,083 | $2,111 | $2,907 |
💹 Capital Return & Share Count Analysis
Net Share Change
+90.2% (2021→2025)
📈 Net dilution — issuances exceed buybacks
| Year | Diluted Shares (M) | YoY Change | Buyback Spend ($M) | Buyback Yield |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | 164.8M | — | — | — |
| 2022 | 182.9M | +11.0% | — | — |
| 2023 | 229.9M | +25.7% | — | — |
| 2024 | 244.5M | +6.3% | — | — |
| 2025 | 313.4M | +28.2% | — | — |
LCID has never repurchased shares. Instead, the company has engaged in massive share issuance to fund operations: shares outstanding have increased from 165M (2021) to 313M (FY2025) to 390M (Q1 2026 fully diluted) — a 136% increase in 4 years. The 1-for-10 reverse split on September 2, 2025, was purely cosmetic and does not change the economic dilution reality. PIF-backed capital raises (convertible preferred, common stock offerings) will continue as long as FCF remains deeply negative. Current dilution rate is ~21% per year. Each $1B capital raise at current prices adds ~158M shares (at $6.34/share), representing ~48% dilution per raise.
⚙️ WACC Build (DCF)
| Input | Value | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Risk-Free Rate (Rf) | 4.30% | 10-yr US Treasury yield |
| Beta (β) | 0.840 | Market beta (Finnhub) |
| Equity Risk Premium (ERP) | 5.5% | Damodaran US ERP |
| Cost of Equity (Ke) | 12.40% | Ke = Rf + β × ERP |
| Pre-Tax Cost of Debt | 7.50% | Interest exp / gross debt |
| After-Tax Cost of Debt (Kd) | 7.50% | × (1 − 0%) |
| Weight Equity (We) | 46.3% | Mkt cap $0.0B |
| Weight Debt (Wd) | 53.7% | Gross debt $0.0B |
| WACC | 12.50% | DCF discount rate |
📈 DCF Scenarios
$-18
🔴 Bear
$7
📊 Base
$28
🚀 Bull
$6.34
Current Price
$15
Analyst Avg PT
| Scenario | Stage 1 (Yrs 1–5) | Stage 2 (Yrs 6–10) | Terminal g | Exit Mult (EV/EBITDA) | WACC | Intrinsic Value | vs Price |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 🔴 Bear | 10.0% | 20.0% | 2.0% | 5.0× | 14.50% | $-18 | ▼386.5% |
| 📊 Base | 10.0% | 20.0% | 2.5% | 8.0× | 12.50% | $7 | ▲13.4% |
| 🚀 Bull | 10.0% | 20.0% | 3.0% | 7.0× | 10.50% | $28 | ▲343.9% |
📋 Full 10-Year Projection Tables
Bear Scenario
Stage 1: 10.0% | Stage 2: 20.0% | Terminal: 2.0%
| Period | Stage | FCFF | PV of FCFF | Cumulative EV |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year 1 ✦ | Stage 1 | $-1.50B | $-1.31B | $-1.31B |
| Year 2 ✦ | Stage 1 | $-1.30B | $-0.99B | $-2.30B |
| Year 3 ✦ | Stage 1 | $-1.10B | $-0.73B | $-3.03B |
| Year 4 ✦ | Stage 1 | $-0.90B | $-0.52B | $-3.56B |
| Year 5 ✦ | Stage 1 | $-0.70B | $-0.36B | $-3.91B |
| Year 6 ✦ | Stage 2 | $-0.50B | $-0.22B | $-4.14B |
| Year 7 ✦ | Stage 2 | $-0.30B | $-0.12B | $-4.25B |
| Year 8 ✦ | Stage 2 | $-0.10B | $-0.03B | $-4.29B |
| Year 9 ✦ | Stage 2 | $0.05B | $0.01B | $-4.27B |
| Year 10 ✦ | Stage 2 | $0.20B | $0.05B | $-4.22B |
| Terminal | — | TV=$1.5B | PV(TV)=$0.4B (-10% of EV) | EV=$-3.8B |
| Intrinsic Value | — | — | EV $-3.8B − Net Debt → Equity / Shares | $-18 |
How the price per share is derived: Each year's projected free cash flow is discounted back at WACC (14.50%) to get its present value. After Year 10, an exit multiple approach values the company at 5.0× EV/EBITDA (Year 10 EBITDA = $0.3B), giving a terminal value of $1.5B. That terminal value is discounted back 10 years to today's dollars (PV of TV = $0.4B). Enterprise Value = PV of FCFs ($-4.2B) + PV of TV ($0.4B) = $-3.8B. Subtracting net debt gives equity value of $-6.0B, divided by shares outstanding = $-18 per share.
Base Scenario
Stage 1: 10.0% | Stage 2: 20.0% | Terminal: 2.5%
| Period | Stage | FCFF | PV of FCFF | Cumulative EV |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year 1 ✦ | Stage 1 | $-1.20B | $-1.07B | $-1.07B |
| Year 2 ✦ | Stage 1 | $-0.80B | $-0.63B | $-1.70B |
| Year 3 ✦ | Stage 1 | $-0.40B | $-0.28B | $-1.98B |
| Year 4 ✦ | Stage 1 | $0.10B | $0.06B | $-1.92B |
| Year 5 ✦ | Stage 1 | $0.50B | $0.28B | $-1.64B |
| Year 6 ✦ | Stage 2 | $0.90B | $0.44B | $-1.20B |
| Year 7 ✦ | Stage 2 | $1.20B | $0.53B | $-0.67B |
| Year 8 ✦ | Stage 2 | $1.50B | $0.58B | $-0.09B |
| Year 9 ✦ | Stage 2 | $1.70B | $0.59B | $0.50B |
| Year 10 ✦ | Stage 2 | $1.90B | $0.59B | $1.09B |
| Terminal | — | TV=$11.2B | PV(TV)=$3.4B (76% of EV) | EV=$4.5B |
| Intrinsic Value | — | — | EV $4.5B − Net Debt → Equity / Shares | $7 |
How the price per share is derived: Each year's projected free cash flow is discounted back at WACC (12.50%) to get its present value. After Year 10, an exit multiple approach values the company at 8.0× EV/EBITDA (Year 10 EBITDA = $1.4B), giving a terminal value of $11.2B. That terminal value is discounted back 10 years to today's dollars (PV of TV = $3.4B). Enterprise Value = PV of FCFs ($1.1B) + PV of TV ($3.4B) = $4.5B. Subtracting net debt gives equity value of $2.4B, divided by shares outstanding = $7 per share.
✦ Year-by-year analyst consensus FCF estimates (Base scenario)
Bull Scenario
Stage 1: 10.0% | Stage 2: 20.0% | Terminal: 3.0%
| Period | Stage | FCFF | PV of FCFF | Cumulative EV |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year 1 ✦ | Stage 1 | $-0.80B | $-0.72B | $-0.72B |
| Year 2 ✦ | Stage 1 | $-0.20B | $-0.16B | $-0.89B |
| Year 3 ✦ | Stage 1 | $0.40B | $0.30B | $-0.59B |
| Year 4 ✦ | Stage 1 | $1.00B | $0.67B | $0.08B |
| Year 5 ✦ | Stage 1 | $1.50B | $0.91B | $0.99B |
| Year 6 ✦ | Stage 2 | $1.90B | $1.04B | $2.03B |
| Year 7 ✦ | Stage 2 | $2.20B | $1.09B | $3.13B |
| Year 8 ✦ | Stage 2 | $2.40B | $1.08B | $4.21B |
| Year 9 ✦ | Stage 2 | $2.60B | $1.06B | $5.27B |
| Year 10 ✦ | Stage 2 | $2.80B | $1.03B | $6.30B |
| Terminal | — | TV=$14.0B | PV(TV)=$5.2B (45% of EV) | EV=$11.5B |
| Intrinsic Value | — | — | EV $11.5B − Net Debt → Equity / Shares | $28 |
How the price per share is derived: Each year's projected free cash flow is discounted back at WACC (10.50%) to get its present value. After Year 10, an exit multiple approach values the company at 7.0× EV/EBITDA (Year 10 EBITDA = $2.0B), giving a terminal value of $14.0B. That terminal value is discounted back 10 years to today's dollars (PV of TV = $5.2B). Enterprise Value = PV of FCFs ($6.3B) + PV of TV ($5.2B) = $11.5B. Subtracting net debt gives equity value of $9.3B, divided by shares outstanding = $28 per share.
🔲 Sensitivity Table
| WACC \ gT | 1.5% | 2.0% | 2.5% | 3.0% | 3.5% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 10.5% | $-328 | $-340 | $-354 | $-369 | $-387 |
| 11.0% | $-306 | $-317 | $-328 | $-342 | $-357 |
| 11.5% | $-287 | $-296 | $-306 | $-317 | $-330 |
| 12.0% | $-270 | $-278 | $-286 | $-296 | $-307 |
| 12.5% | $-254 | $-261 | $-269 | $-277 | $-286 |
| 13.0% | $-240 | $-246 | $-253 | $-260 | $-268 |
| 13.5% | $-227 | $-233 | $-238 | $-245 | $-252 |
| 14.0% | $-216 | $-220 | $-226 | $-231 | $-237 |
| 14.5% | $-205 | $-209 | $-214 | $-219 | $-224 |
Green = >10% above current price. Red = >10% below. Gold = within ±10%.
📉 Long-Term Price Trend Channel
Log-linear trend fitted to full price history. ±1.5σ bands. Green shaded zone = bottom 25% of historical range — historically attractive entry.
🏦 Comparable Valuation
| Company | Ticker | P/S | EV/Sales | EV/EBITDA | Gross Margin | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lucid Group | LCID | 1.8× | 3.5× | N/M | -95.6% | Pre-profitability; neg margins |
| Tesla | TSLA | 8.5× | 8.2× | 62× | 18.2% | Scaled EV; benchmark |
| Rivian | RIVN | 3.2× | 2.8× | N/M | -28.5% | Pre-profitability peer |
| NIO | NIO | 1.4× | 1.6× | N/M | -12.3% | Chinese EV; similar dilution risk |
| Fisker | FSRN | N/A | N/A | N/M | N/A | Bankrupt — cautionary tale |
💰 Dividend / Distribution Analysis
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Annual DPS | $0.000 |
| Current Yield | 0.00% |
| Consecutive Growth Years | 0 |
| 1-yr DPS CAGR | N/A |
| 3-yr DPS CAGR | N/A |
| 5-yr DPS CAGR | N/A |
| 10-yr DPS CAGR | — |
| Payout Ratio (DPS/EPS) | 0.0% |
| FCF Payout Ratio | 0.0% |
| Sustainability Verdict | N/A — No Dividend |
LCID does not pay a dividend and is unlikely to for the foreseeable future. All available capital is required to fund operations and growth. Dividend investors should avoid this name entirely.
🔮 Analyst Forecast Section
(a) EPS Consensus
| Year | Low / Actual | Avg | High | # Analysts | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | $-15.10 | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2023 | $-13.59 | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2024 | $-12.52 | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2025 | $-11.81 | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2026 | $-10.68 | $-8.64 | $-6.86 | 16 | Estimate |
| 2027 | $-8.42 | $-5.31 | $-2.96 | 15 | Estimate |
(b) Revenue Consensus
| Year | Low / Actual | Avg | High | # Analysts | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | $0.6B | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2023 | $0.6B | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2024 | $0.8B | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2025 | $1.4B | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2026 | $1.8B | $2.3B | $2.7B | 16 | Estimate |
| 2027 | $3.0B | $4.4B | $5.2B | 15 | Estimate |
(c) Individual Analyst Price Targets
| Analyst | Firm | Rating | PT | Upside |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adam Jonas | Morgan Stanley | Hold | $30 | +373.2% |
| Stephen Gengaro | Stifel | Hold | $17 | +168.1% |
| Michael Ward | Citigroup | Strong Buy | $17 | +168.1% |
| Andres Sheppard | Cantor Fitzgerald | Hold | $14 | +120.8% |
| Ben Kallo | Baird | Hold | $12 | +89.3% |
| Andrew Percoco | Morgan Stanley | Sell | $10 | +57.7% |
| Itay Michaeli | TD Cowen | Hold | $7 | +10.4% |
| Mickey Legg | Benchmark | Hold | $5 | -21.1% |
💡 Investment Thesis
- Bull case (technology premium): Lucid's proprietary drivetrain technology delivers industry-leading efficiency (5+ miles/kWh). If the Gravity and Midsize vehicles achieve production scale and the robotaxi partnership with Uber generates fleet revenue, Lucid could reach breakeven by FY2028-2029. PIF backing provides a deep-pocketed strategic investor unlikely to let the company fail.
- Bear case (dilution treadmill): Lucid has burned >$10B since inception with no path to profitability before 2028 at the earliest. Shares outstanding have increased from 165M to 390M (+136% dilution since 2021). The 1-for-10 reverse split in September 2025 masks the severity. Continued capital raises will further dilute existing shareholders. Altman Z-Score of -3.95 signals significant distress risk.
- Key swing factor: Revenue growth rate and gross margin trajectory. If Lucid can't improve gross margin from -96% toward positive within 2-3 years, the dilution treadmill accelerates and intrinsic value collapses toward zero. The current gross margin of -96% (TTM) is among the worst in the auto industry — even Tesla took years to reach positive gross margin, and Lucid is further behind.
- Robotaxi wildcard: The Uber partnership (35,000+ vehicles) provides potential fleet revenue visibility, but regulatory and technological hurdles remain. If this materializes it could add $1-2B in annual revenue by 2028-2029 — but it's speculative.
- PIF put option: Saudi Arabia's Public Investment Fund has invested ~$10B and controls Lucid. This provides a floor against bankruptcy but does NOT protect against dilution. PIF will continue funding (via convertible preferred and common issuances) which systematically transfers value from minority shareholders to PIF.
👔 Management Quality & Culture
CEO: Was Paid · Tenure: Since 2025 (~1 yrs) · ★ Founder
⚠️ Key-Person Risk: HIGH
Founder-led company — strategy and culture deeply tied to a single individual. Succession planning is a material risk.
Net Insider Buys (12m)
+3,701,943 shares
Incentive Alignment
⚠️ Moderate
Compensation: Equity-based compensation present
CEO Background & Track Record
Lucid Motors - Wikipedia
On November 29, 2016, Lucid executives and officials in Arizona announced the planned construction of Lucid's US$700 million manufacturing plant in Casa Grande, Arizona, which was projected to employ up to 2,000 workers by the mid-2020
On November 29, 2016, Lucid executives and officials in Arizona announced the planned construction of Lucid's US$700 million manufacturing plant in Casa Grande, Arizona, which was projected to employ up to 2,000 workers by the mid-2020
Lucid Announces CEO Transition | Lucid Group, Inc.
Since launching Lucid in 2016, Peter has been instrumental in the company's transition from concept to reality and in developing unique, world-leading technology that has defined the next generation of EVs," said
Since launching Lucid in 2016, Peter has been instrumental in the company's transition from concept to reality and in developing unique, world-leading technology that has defined the next generation of EVs," said
Lucid Group, Inc. (LCID) Leadership & Management Team Analys
Lucid Group's CEO is Marc Winterhoff, appointed in Feb 2025, has a tenure of less than a year. total yearly compensation is $6.65M, comprised of 9% salary and 91% bonuses, including company stock and options. directly
Lucid Group's CEO is Marc Winterhoff, appointed in Feb 2025, has a tenure of less than a year. total yearly compensation is $6.65M, comprised of 9% salary and 91% bonuses, including company stock and options. directly
Capital Allocation & Strategy
Investor Relations | Lucid Group, Inc.
The Investor Relations website contains information about Lucid Group, Inc. 's business for stockholders, potential investors, and financial analysts.
The Investor Relations website contains information about Lucid Group, Inc. 's business for stockholders, potential investors, and financial analysts.
Lucid Motors - Wikipedia
On August 7, 2024, Lucid Group announced a further $1.5 billion in funding from its majority shareholder, Ayar Third Investment Co., an affiliate of PIF. The deal includes $750 million in convertible preferred stock and the
On August 7, 2024, Lucid Group announced a further $1.5 billion in funding from its majority shareholder, Ayar Third Investment Co., an affiliate of PIF. The deal includes $750 million in convertible preferred stock and the
Employee Ratings
Overall Rating
3.9/5 ★★★★☆
Reviews
29
Culture Signal
Mixed
✅ Strengths
- recommend
⚠️ Concerns
- cuts
Employee Review Excerpts
Lucid Reviews (29): Pros & Cons of Working At Lucid | Glassd
The Lucid employee rating is in line with the average (within 1 standard deviation) for employers within the Information Technology industry (3.9 stars).Read more · 3 · Worklife topics · 29 reviews · Sort by most recent · 3
The Lucid employee rating is in line with the average (within 1 standard deviation) for employers within the Information Technology industry (3.9 stars).Read more · 3 · Worklife topics · 29 reviews · Sort by most recent · 3
Lucid Reviews (134): Pros & Cons of Working At Lucid | Glass
How satisfied are employees working at Lucid?67% of Lucid employees would recommend working there to a friend based on Glassdoor reviews. Employees also rated Lucid 3.4 out of 5 for work life balance, 3.5 for culture and values
How satisfied are employees working at Lucid?67% of Lucid employees would recommend working there to a friend based on Glassdoor reviews. Employees also rated Lucid 3.4 out of 5 for work life balance, 3.5 for culture and values
Lucid Group Reviews (133): Pros & Cons of Working At Lucid G
How satisfied are employees working at Lucid Group?36% of Lucid Group employees would recommend working there to a friend based on Glassdoor reviews. Employees also rated Lucid Group 2.5 out of 5 for work life balance, 2.7 for cultu
How satisfied are employees working at Lucid Group?36% of Lucid Group employees would recommend working there to a friend based on Glassdoor reviews. Employees also rated Lucid Group 2.5 out of 5 for work life balance, 2.7 for cultu
Sources: Finnhub insider data · Brave Search (Glassdoor, Indeed, Comparably, news) · Earnings surprise data from analyst forecasts · Qualitative signals are directional only.
⚖️ DCF Verdict: Avoid — Lucid Group, Inc. (LCID)
Current price: $6.34 | Analyst Avg PT: $15.29
$-18
🔴 Bear
$7
📊 Base
$28
🚀 Bull
| Tier | Price | Action |
|---|---|---|
| Tier 1 — Starter | ≤$4 | Begin position |
| Tier 2 — Add | ≤$3 | Add on weakness |
| Tier 3 — Full | ≤$2 | Full allocation |
| Sell Alert | ≥$10 | Above fair value — consider trimming |
How tiers are set: Tier 1 = Base IV × 0.92 (8% discount to base case). Tier 2 = midpoint of Bear & Base IV (building on meaningful weakness). Tier 3 = Bear IV × 1.05 (just above worst-case — maximum margin of safety). Sell alert = Bull IV × 0.85 (15% discount to bull case — above fair value range).
Verdict: Avoid. Lucid Group is a pre-profitability EV manufacturer burning $3.8B+ annually with negative gross margins, extreme dilution (+136% share count increase since 2021), and an Altman Z-Score of -3.95 indicating severe financial distress. While PIF backing prevents near-term bankruptcy, it accelerates dilution — minority shareholders are systematically diluted with every capital raise. The base-case DCF shows intrinsic value of ~$7 per share, roughly in line with the current price, offering no margin of safety. The bear case yields $0 (equity worthless), and even the bull case at ~$28 requires near-perfect execution across three unproven product lines. With 450 shares at an average cost of $44.40 (current price $6.34), the position is down ~86%. There are far better risk/reward setups in the portfolio. Recommend exiting on any strength and redeploying capital into higher-conviction names.
📂 Current Position Summary
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Shares Held | 450 |
| Average Cost Basis | $44.40 |
| Current Market Value | $2,853 |
| Unrealized P&L | $-17,127 (-85.7%) |
| Annual DPS | — (not provided) |
| Annual Dividend Income | — (DPS missing) |
| Current Yield (at price) | — |
| Yield on Cost | — |
| vs Target (~$200K) | $2,853 / $200,000 (1%) |
🔧 Model Notes & Calibration
| Assumption | Rationale / Notes |
|---|---|
| Model Selection | LCID is a pre-profitability EV manufacturer (Stage 2: Hyper Growth). DDM is inappropriate — no dividend, negative FCF. DCF is the correct model, but standard perpetuity-growth DCF fails because all FCF values are negative, making terminal value calculations meaningless. We use an exit multiple approach with explicit FCF projections for all 10 years that transition from losses to profitability, and terminal value based on EV/EBITDA × Year 10 EBITDA. |
| FCF Projections (Normalized) | Reported FY2025 FCF is -$3.8B, which includes ~$870M in growth capex for factory buildout (Arizona Phase 2, Saudi Arabia AMP-2). Our "normalized" FCF projections exclude recurring growth capex and represent operating cash flow minus maintenance capex (~$300-400M/yr). This is standard practice for pre-profitability company valuation — growth capex creates future value and should not be treated as a permanent cash drain. Bear case FCF stays negative through Year 9. Base case turns positive in Year 4. Bull case turns positive in Year 3. |
| WACC Calibration | Standard CAPM gives Ke=8.92% (Rf 4.3%, β 0.84, ERP 5.5%). However, LCID's low beta reflects PIF correlation, not low business risk. We add a 3.5pp pre-profitability/size/dilution premium → Ke 12.4%. WACC 12.5% reflects the 50/50 debt-equity split (market cap $2.5B vs. total debt $2.9B) and zero tax shield. Bear case uses 14.5% WACC (higher execution risk); Bull uses 10.5%. |
| Exit Multiple (EV/EBITDA) | Bear: 5× EBITDA on $300M (5% margin, $6B revenue) → TV $1.5B. Base: 8× EBITDA on $1,400M (10% margin, $14B revenue) → TV $11.2B. Bull: 7× EBITDA on $2,000M (10% margin, $20B revenue) → TV $14.0B. These multiples reflect mature auto OEM valuations (5-8×) with growth premium in the bull case. Tesla trades at 62× EBITDA; legacy OEMs at 4-6×. |
| Dilution Risk | Shares have increased from 165M (2021) to 390M (Q1 2026) — +136% dilution. The 1-for-10 reverse split (Sep 2025) is cosmetic. We use 330M diluted shares but note that ongoing capital raises will dilute further. Each $1B raise at $6.34/share adds ~158M shares (~48% dilution). The model does NOT account for future dilution — actual per-share value will be lower than modeled if dilution continues. A 30-50% dilution haircut on all scenario IVs is reasonable. |
| Sanity Check Note | Base IV of ~$7 is well below the analyst consensus PT of $15.29. This is expected — analyst PTs for pre-profitability companies often reflect speculative value and optionality, not DCF fundamentals. The 141% upside in consensus PTs vs. the $6.34 stock price signals low analyst conviction. Our DCF is anchored to cash flow reality, not hope. The bull case IV of ~$28 requires near-perfect execution on all fronts. |
| Altman Z-Score | LCID's Z-Score of -3.95 indicates significant financial distress. This is common for pre-profitability companies but underscores the binary nature of the investment: either Lucid reaches scale and the stock works, or it continues burning cash and dilution destroys shareholder value. There is no middle path. |
Bore Family Office • Analysis generated by Lurch • Not investment advice.