ADM
ADM
Archer-Daniels-Midland is one of the world's largest agricultural processors and commodity trading companies, operating across oilseed processing (soybean, canola), carbohydrate solutions (corn wet milling, wheat), nutrition (specialty ingredients, flavors), and agricultural services (grain merchandising, transportation). Founded in 1902, ADM processes >50% of US soybeans and is a critical link in the global food supply chain. The company has raised its dividend for 17 consecutive years, though growth has slowed to ~2% recently. ADM faces cyclical margin compression and an ongoing accounting investigation (2024) that has impaired investor confidence.
| Business Segment | Revenue | % of Total | YoY Growth | Margin | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ag Services & Oilseeds | $42,500M | 53% | -8.0% | — | Grain trading, soybean/canola crushing, tropical oils |
| Carbohydrate Solutions | $18,500M | 23% | -4.0% | — | Corn wet milling, starches, sweeteners, ethanol |
| Nutrition | $8,500M | 11% | -6.0% | — | Specialty ingredients, flavors, proteins, supplements |
| Other / Corporate | $10,769M | 13% | -3.0% | — | Risk management, freight, corporate |
| Blended Growth Rate | — | 100% | -6.2% | — | Weighted avg across segments |
Startup
Hyper Growth
Self Funding
Operating Leverage
Capital Return
Decline
Stage 5 — Capital Return: Mature business returning capital via dividends and buybacks. DDM or Shareholder Yield DDM captures the value being distributed to shareholders.
Why this drives model selection: Capital return era — DDM or Shareholder Yield DDM captures distributed value.
| Metric | Value | Assessment |
|---|---|---|
| ROIC | 4.0% | <8% weak |
| FCF Margin | 5.2% | 5–10% adequate |
| Debt / EBITDA | 3.8x | 2–4x moderate |
| Revenue Trend | Declining 3yr | 3-year directional trend |
| FCF Margin Trend | Stable (±1pp) | Directional margin trajectory |
| Analyst Revisions | Downward revisions | Last 90 days consensus direction |
| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue ($M) | $85,249 | $101,556 | $93,935 | $85,530 | $80,269 |
| Rev YoY Growth | — | +19.1% | -7.5% | -8.9% | -6.2% |
| Gross Margin | 7.0% | 7.5% | 8.0% | 6.8% | 6.3% |
| EBITDA ($M) | $3,731 | $4,816 | $4,598 | $2,417 | $1,982 |
| EBITDA Margin | 4.4% | 4.7% | 4.9% | 2.8% | 2.5% |
| Operating Income ($M) | $2,735 | $3,788 | $3,539 | $1,276 | $801 |
| Operating Margin | 3.2% | 3.7% | 3.8% | 1.5% | 1.0% |
| Net Income ($M) | $2,709 | $4,340 | $3,483 | $1,800 | $1,078 |
| Net Margin | 3.2% | 4.3% | 3.7% | 2.1% | 1.3% |
| EPS (diluted) | $4.79 | $7.71 | $6.43 | $3.65 | $2.23 |
| Free Cash Flow ($M) | $5,426 | $2,159 | $2,966 | $1,227 | $4,204 |
| Annual DPS | $1.480 | $1.600 | $1.800 | $2.000 | $2.040 |
| Total Debt ($M) | $8,581 | $8,677 | $8,260 | $8,254 | $7,612 |
| Year | Diluted Shares (M) | YoY Change | Buyback Spend ($M) | Buyback Yield |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | 560.0M | — | $200 | 0.5% |
| 2022 | 563.0M | +0.5% | $800 | 2.0% |
| 2023 | 542.0M | -3.7% | $1,200 | 3.2% |
| 2024 | 493.0M | -9.0% | $1,800 | 5.2% |
| 2025 | 481.0M | -2.4% | $500 | 1.5% |
ADM accelerated buybacks in 2023-2024, retiring ~14% of shares. 2025 buybacks slowed to ~$500M as cash was prioritized for debt reduction and the dividend. Share count decline is meaningful and consistent.
| Input | Value | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Risk-Free Rate (Rf) | 4.25% | 10-yr US Treasury yield |
| Beta (β) | 0.560 | Market beta (Finnhub) |
| Equity Risk Premium (ERP) | 5.5% | Damodaran US ERP |
| Cost of Equity (Ke) | 7.33% | Ke = Rf + β × ERP |
| Pre-Tax Cost of Debt | 4.50% | Interest exp / gross debt |
| After-Tax Cost of Debt (Kd) | 3.56% | × (1 − 21%) |
| Weight Equity (We) | 81.6% | Mkt cap $0.0B |
| Weight Debt (Wd) | 18.4% | Gross debt $0.0B |
| WACC | 9.00% | DCF discount rate |
| Scenario | Stage 1 (Yrs 1–5) | Stage 2 (Yrs 6–10) | Terminal g | WACC | Intrinsic Value | vs Price |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 🔴 Bear | -5.0% | 0.0% | 2.0% | 10.50% | $27 | ▼62.1% |
| 📊 Base | 3.0% | 2.0% | 2.5% | 9.00% | $73 | ▲4.7% |
| 🚀 Bull | 8.0% | 4.0% | 3.0% | 8.00% | $150 | ▲114.7% |
| Period | Stage | FCFF | PV of FCFF | Cumulative EV |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year 1 ✦ | Stage 1 | $1.80B | $1.63B | $1.63B |
| Year 2 ✦ | Stage 1 | $1.70B | $1.39B | $3.02B |
| Year 3 ✦ | Stage 1 | $1.60B | $1.19B | $4.21B |
| Year 4 ✦ | Stage 1 | $1.50B | $1.01B | $5.21B |
| Year 5 ✦ | Stage 1 | $1.50B | $0.91B | $6.12B |
| Year 6 | Stage 2 | $1.50B | $0.82B | $6.95B |
| Year 7 | Stage 2 | $1.50B | $0.75B | $7.69B |
| Year 8 | Stage 2 | $1.50B | $0.67B | $8.37B |
| Year 9 | Stage 2 | $1.50B | $0.61B | $8.98B |
| Year 10 | Stage 2 | $1.50B | $0.55B | $9.53B |
| Terminal | — | TV=$18.0B | PV(TV)=$6.6B (41% of EV) | EV=$16.2B |
| Intrinsic Value | — | — | EV $16.2B − Net Debt → Equity / Shares | $27 |
| Period | Stage | FCFF | PV of FCFF | Cumulative EV |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year 1 ✦ | Stage 1 | $2.50B | $2.29B | $2.29B |
| Year 2 ✦ | Stage 1 | $2.58B | $2.17B | $4.47B |
| Year 3 ✦ | Stage 1 | $2.66B | $2.05B | $6.52B |
| Year 4 ✦ | Stage 1 | $2.74B | $1.94B | $8.46B |
| Year 5 ✦ | Stage 1 | $2.83B | $1.84B | $10.30B |
| Year 6 | Stage 2 | $2.89B | $1.72B | $12.02B |
| Year 7 | Stage 2 | $2.94B | $1.61B | $13.63B |
| Year 8 | Stage 2 | $3.00B | $1.51B | $15.14B |
| Year 9 | Stage 2 | $3.06B | $1.41B | $16.55B |
| Year 10 | Stage 2 | $3.12B | $1.32B | $17.87B |
| Terminal | — | TV=$49.3B | PV(TV)=$20.8B (54% of EV) | EV=$38.7B |
| Intrinsic Value | — | — | EV $38.7B − Net Debt → Equity / Shares | $73 |
| Period | Stage | FCFF | PV of FCFF | Cumulative EV |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year 1 ✦ | Stage 1 | $3.00B | $2.78B | $2.78B |
| Year 2 ✦ | Stage 1 | $3.30B | $2.83B | $5.61B |
| Year 3 ✦ | Stage 1 | $3.60B | $2.86B | $8.46B |
| Year 4 ✦ | Stage 1 | $3.90B | $2.87B | $11.33B |
| Year 5 ✦ | Stage 1 | $4.20B | $2.86B | $14.19B |
| Year 6 | Stage 2 | $4.37B | $2.75B | $16.94B |
| Year 7 | Stage 2 | $4.54B | $2.65B | $19.59B |
| Year 8 | Stage 2 | $4.72B | $2.55B | $22.15B |
| Year 9 | Stage 2 | $4.91B | $2.46B | $24.60B |
| Year 10 | Stage 2 | $5.11B | $2.37B | $26.97B |
| Terminal | — | TV=$105.3B | PV(TV)=$48.8B (64% of EV) | EV=$75.7B |
| Intrinsic Value | — | — | EV $75.7B − Net Debt → Equity / Shares | $150 |
| WACC \ gT | 1.5% | 2.0% | 2.5% | 3.0% | 3.5% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7.0% | $97 | $104 | $112 | $122 | $135 |
| 7.5% | $88 | $94 | $100 | $108 | $117 |
| 8.0% | $81 | $85 | $90 | $96 | $104 |
| 8.5% | $75 | $78 | $82 | $87 | $93 |
| 9.0% | $69 | $72 | $75 | $79 | $84 |
| 9.5% | $64 | $67 | $69 | $73 | $76 |
| 10.0% | $60 | $62 | $64 | $67 | $70 |
| 10.5% | $56 | $58 | $60 | $62 | $65 |
| 11.0% | $53 | $54 | $56 | $58 | $60 |
Green = >10% above current price. Red = >10% below. Gold = within ±10%.
Log-linear trend fitted to full price history. ±1.5σ bands. Green shaded zone = bottom 25% of historical range — historically attractive entry.
| Company | Ticker | P/E | EV/EBITDA | P/FCF | Div Yield | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bunge | BG | 11.5x | 7.8x | 14.0x | 2.8% | Oilseed peer; being acquired by Glencore |
| Cargill | Private | — | — | — | ~2.5% | Private peer; similar commodity exposure |
| Ingredion | INGR | 14.2x | 10.5x | 16.0x | 2.6% | Corn processing; higher margin |
| Tyson Foods | TSN | 15.0x | 9.2x | 18.0x | 3.2% | Protein processor; cyclical |
| ADM 5yr Avg | ADM | 14.5x | 9.0x | 15.0x | 2.6% | Own history: trading at discount to avg |
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Annual DPS | $2.040 |
| Current Yield | 2.91% |
| Consecutive Growth Years | 17 |
| 1-yr DPS CAGR | +2.0% |
| 3-yr DPS CAGR | +4.2% |
| 5-yr DPS CAGR | +5.0% |
| 10-yr DPS CAGR | +6.0% |
| Payout Ratio (DPS/EPS) | 91.5% ⚠️ |
| FCF Payout Ratio | 23.3% |
| Sustainability Verdict | Watch |
| Year | Low / Actual | Avg | High | # Analysts | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | $4.79 | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2022 | $7.71 | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2023 | $6.43 | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2024 | $3.65 | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2025 | $2.23 | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2026 | $3.68 | $4.24 | $5.33 | 15 | Estimate |
| 2027 | $4.02 | $4.91 | $6.20 | 14 | Estimate |
| Year | Low / Actual | Avg | High | # Analysts | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | $85.2B | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2022 | $101.6B | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2023 | $93.9B | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2024 | $85.5B | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2025 | $80.3B | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2026 | $79.0B | $84.1B | $90.8B | 15 | Estimate |
| 2027 | $79.9B | $86.5B | $94.7B | 14 | Estimate |
| Analyst | Firm | Rating | PT | Upside |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dushyant Ailani | Jefferies | Hold | $77 | +10.0% |
| Benjamin Theurer | Barclays | Hold | $77 | +10.0% |
| Thomas Palmer | JP Morgan | Sell | $65 | -7.2% |
- Deep value on trough earnings: At 16.5× forward EPS and 2.9% yield, ADM prices in continued margin deterioration. Any stabilization in crush margins drives a sharp re-rating.
- Essential infrastructure: ADM's processing assets are irreplaceable infrastructure — 50%+ US soybean crush capacity and a global logistics network create a wide moat.
- 17-year dividend growth streak: Even through the current downturn, ADM has maintained and grown the dividend. FCF of $4.2B covers the $980M dividend with ample room.
- Key risk — accounting investigation: The 2024 accounting probe into Nutrition segment intersegment transfers has eroded investor trust. CFO resigned. Multiple class-action lawsuits pending.
Compensation: Equity-based compensation present
Dwayne Andreas was named CEO of ADM in 1970, and two years later was elected chairman of the company's board. Under his leadership, Archer Daniels Midland acquired many smaller agricultural companies and expanded into
Archer Daniels Midland's Chairman of the Board of Directors, President, Chief Executive Officer is Juan R. Luciano. Archer Daniels Midland's key executives include Juan R.
Mr. Luciano joined ADM in 2011 as Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer. He was named President in February 2014, and in January 2015 became the ninth Chief Executive in ADM’s 112-year history.
In 2024, the company returned $3.3 billion in the form of dividends and share repurchases, allocated $1.6 billion to capital expenditures to support the reliability of our assets and cost efficiencies, and approximately $1
Cash flows from operations before working capital is cash flows from operating activities of $2,780 million excluding the changes in working capital of $(519) million in YTD 2024.
- work-life balance
- recommend
79% of Archer Daniels Midland (ADM) employees would recommend working there to a friend based on Glassdoor reviews. Employees also rated Archer Daniels Midland (ADM) 3.4 out of 5 for work life balance, 3.7 for culture and values
Archer Daniels Midland (ADM) See All Reviews (1301)See All (1301) April 4, 2017 · StarStarStarStarStar · Work/Life Balance · Culture & Values · Career Opportunities · Compensation and Benefits · Senior Management · Former Employee - Tax
According to reviews on CareerBliss, employees commonly rated the pros of working at Archer Daniels Midland to be Company Culture, Growth Opportunities, People You Work With and Person You Work For, and no cons.
| Tier | Price | Action |
|---|---|---|
| Tier 1 — Starter | ≤$67 | Begin position |
| Tier 2 — Add | ≤$50 | Add on weakness |
| Tier 3 — Full | ≤$25 | Full allocation |
| Sell Alert | ≥$128 | Above fair value — consider trimming |
Verdict: Hold. ADM is a deep-value cyclical at trough margins, but the accounting investigation overhang and margin uncertainty warrant patience. The 2.9% yield is well-covered. Add below $60 on further weakness; full position below $50. Becomes a trim above $80.
| Assumption | Rationale / Notes |
|---|---|
| Model Selection | DCF — ADM has a 17-year dividend streak but DPS growth has slowed to 2% and the company is cyclical with thin margins. DCF on FCF better captures the cyclical cash flow profile than DDM on a slowly growing DPS. |
| FCF Base | Normalized to $2.5B mid-cycle FCF. FY2025 reported FCF of $4.2B is inflated by ~$1.7B working capital release and reduced capex. Mid-cycle FCF of $2-3B is the sustainable base (consistent with EBITDA of $2B and 6% thin-margin economics). |
| Accounting Overhang | The 2024 Nutrition segment accounting investigation (intersegment transfer pricing) led to CFO resignation and restated financials. This is a real governance risk that justifies a discount. Models cannot fully capture this — noted as qualitative risk. |
| Lifecycle | Classifier failed — analyst judgment: Stage 5 (Mature Cash Cow). ADM is a mature processor with cyclical margins, moderate growth, and a reliable but slow-growing dividend. The business generates real cash but is not a growth story. |