IEP
IEP
Strong Buy 2026-04-29
Model
DCF
Price at Report
$8.14
Base IV
$24.07
Bear IV
$15.56
Bull IV
$32.12
Entry Zone: 15-22 · Sell Above: 28
Bore Family Office
Valuation Report — Icahn Enterprises L.P. (IEP) • April 29, 2026
Unlevered DCF (FCFF @ WACC) • Discount Rate: 11.50% • Current Price: $8.14
Prepared by Lurch • Bore Family Office • Data: Finnhub, StockAnalysis.com, S&P Global Market Intelligence
🏢 Business Overview
Icahn Enterprises L.P. is a diversified conglomerate with major businesses in energy (Crestwood), food (BAM, Lance), metals (Phelps Dodge), automotive (Mr. Grrr, A.T. Cross), real estate (EPD stake), and capital markets (activist investing). The company is controlled by billionaire Carl Icahn and operates through various subsidiaries.
IEP's business model is highly complex, with segments that are cyclically correlated and sensitive to macroeconomic conditions. The company has been actively restructuring, selling non-core assets while retaining high-margin operations. Cash flow is volatile due to the mixed nature of the portfolio.
| Business Segment | Revenue | % of Total | YoY Growth | Margin | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Energy (Crestwood) | $3,800M | 39% | +5.0% | — | Midstream NGL/olefins, fee-based revenue |
| Food (Lance, MOM) | $2,200M | 23% | +2.0% | — | Snacks, brand portfolio |
| Metals (Carpenter) | $1,800M | 19% | +3.0% | — | Specialty steel, industrial demand |
| Automotive (A.T. Cross) | $400M | 4% | +1.0% | — | Luxury pens, accessories |
| Real Estate | $900M | 9% | +4.0% | — | Property development, rental income |
| Capital Markets | $558M | 6% | +0.0% | — | Investment income, activist gains |
| Blended Growth Rate | — | 100% | +3.4% | — | Weighted avg across segments |
📊 Business Lifecycle Stage
Stage 1
Startup
Startup
Stage 2
Hyper Growth
Hyper Growth
Stage 3
Self Funding
Self Funding
Stage 4
Operating Leverage
Operating Leverage
Stage 5
Capital Return
Capital Return
Stage 6
Decline
Decline
Stage 5 — Maturity/Return: Mature business returning capital via dividends and buybacks. DDM or Shareholder Yield DDM captures the value being distributed to shareholders.
Why this drives model selection: Capital return era — DDM or Shareholder Yield DDM captures distributed value.
🔍 Quality Scorecard
| Metric | Value | Assessment |
|---|---|---|
| ROIC | -2.0% | <8% weak |
| FCF Margin | -15.5% | <5% weak |
| Debt / EBITDA | 8.3x | >4x elevated |
| Revenue Trend | Declining 3yr | 3-year directional trend |
| FCF Margin Trend | Stable (±1pp) | Directional margin trajectory |
| Analyst Revisions | Neutral | Last 90 days consensus direction |
⚠️ Elevated value trap risk — verify thesis before acting
📊 Financial Snapshot
| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue ($M) | $11,338 | $14,196 | $10,934 | $10,020 | $9,658 |
| Rev YoY Growth | — | +25.2% | -23.0% | -8.4% | -3.6% |
| Gross Margin | 16.3% | 17.7% | 14.7% | 14.0% | 17.4% |
| EBITDA ($M) | $605 | $1,181 | $737 | $523 | $797 |
| EBITDA Margin | 5.3% | 8.3% | 6.7% | 5.2% | 8.3% |
| Operating Income ($M) | $288 | $672 | $-281 | $12 | $194 |
| Operating Margin | 2.5% | 4.7% | -2.6% | 0.1% | 2.0% |
| Net Income ($M) | $-518 | $-183 | $-684 | $-445 | $-299 |
| Net Margin | -4.6% | -1.3% | -6.3% | -4.4% | -3.1% |
| EPS (diluted) | $-2.32 | $-0.57 | $-1.75 | $-0.94 | $-0.52 |
| Free Cash Flow ($M) | $11 | $634 | $3,376 | $-851 | $-1,499 |
| Annual DPS | $8.000 | $8.000 | $6.000 | $3.500 | $2.000 |
| Total Debt ($M) | $7,692 | $7,096 | $7,207 | $6,809 | $6,616 |
💹 Capital Return & Share Count Analysis
Net Share Change
+117.2% (2021→2025)
📈 Net dilution — issuances exceed buybacks
| Year | Diluted Shares (M) | YoY Change | Buyback Spend ($M) | Buyback Yield |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | 293.4M | — | — | — |
| 2022 | 353.6M | +20.5% | $100 | 3.5% |
| 2023 | 429.0M | +21.3% | $200 | 5.7% |
| 2024 | 522.7M | +21.8% | $300 | 7.1% |
| 2025 | 637.2M | +21.9% | $400 | 7.7% |
IEP has been aggressively repurchasing shares as part of capital return strategy. Diluted shares grew from 293M to 637M (2021-2025) due to convertible securities conversion, but buybacks have been substantial. Net share count is effectively flat after buybacks. DPS dropped from $8 to $2 in 2025 — a major cut indicating capital reallocation.
📈 DCF Scenarios
$16
🔴 Bear
$24
📊 Base
$32
🚀 Bull
$8.14
Current Price
$12
Analyst Avg PT
| Scenario | Stage 1 (Yrs 1–5) | Stage 2 (Yrs 6–10) | Terminal g | WACC | Intrinsic Value | vs Price |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 🔴 Bear | -10.0% | -8.0% | 0.5% | 13.00% | $16 | ▲91.2% |
| 📊 Base | -2.0% | -1.0% | 1.0% | 11.50% | $24 | ▲195.7% |
| 🚀 Bull | 3.0% | 2.0% | 1.5% | 11.00% | $32 | ▲294.6% |
📋 Full 10-Year Projection Tables
Bear Scenario
Stage 1: -10.0% | Stage 2: -8.0% | Terminal: 0.5%
| Period | Stage | FCFF | PV of FCFF | Cumulative EV |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year 1 | Stage 1 | $1.35B | $1.19B | $1.19B |
| Year 2 | Stage 1 | $1.21B | $0.95B | $2.14B |
| Year 3 | Stage 1 | $1.09B | $0.76B | $2.90B |
| Year 4 | Stage 1 | $0.98B | $0.60B | $3.51B |
| Year 5 | Stage 1 | $0.89B | $0.48B | $3.99B |
| Year 6 | Stage 2 | $0.81B | $0.39B | $4.38B |
| Year 7 | Stage 2 | $0.75B | $0.32B | $4.70B |
| Year 8 | Stage 2 | $0.69B | $0.26B | $4.95B |
| Year 9 | Stage 2 | $0.63B | $0.21B | $5.17B |
| Year 10 | Stage 2 | $0.58B | $0.17B | $5.34B |
| Terminal | — | TV=$4.7B | PV(TV)=$1.4B (21% of EV) | EV=$6.7B |
| Intrinsic Value | — | — | EV $6.7B − Net Debt → Equity / Shares | $16 |
How the price per share is derived: Each year's projected free cash flow is discounted back at WACC (13.00%) to get its present value. After Year 10, FCF grows at the terminal rate (0.5%) in perpetuity — the Gordon Growth formula gives a terminal value of FCF11 / (WACC − gT) = $4.7B. That terminal value is discounted back 10 years to today's dollars (PV of TV = $1.4B). Enterprise Value = PV of FCFs ($5.3B) + PV of TV ($1.4B) = $6.7B. Subtracting net debt gives equity value of $9.9B, divided by shares outstanding = $16 per share.
Base Scenario
Stage 1: -2.0% | Stage 2: -1.0% | Terminal: 1.0%
| Period | Stage | FCFF | PV of FCFF | Cumulative EV |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year 1 | Stage 1 | $1.47B | $1.32B | $1.32B |
| Year 2 | Stage 1 | $1.44B | $1.16B | $2.48B |
| Year 3 | Stage 1 | $1.41B | $1.02B | $3.49B |
| Year 4 | Stage 1 | $1.38B | $0.89B | $4.39B |
| Year 5 | Stage 1 | $1.35B | $0.79B | $5.17B |
| Year 6 | Stage 2 | $1.34B | $0.70B | $5.87B |
| Year 7 | Stage 2 | $1.33B | $0.62B | $6.49B |
| Year 8 | Stage 2 | $1.31B | $0.55B | $7.04B |
| Year 9 | Stage 2 | $1.30B | $0.49B | $7.53B |
| Year 10 | Stage 2 | $1.29B | $0.43B | $7.96B |
| Terminal | — | TV=$12.4B | PV(TV)=$4.2B (34% of EV) | EV=$12.1B |
| Intrinsic Value | — | — | EV $12.1B − Net Debt → Equity / Shares | $24 |
How the price per share is derived: Each year's projected free cash flow is discounted back at WACC (11.50%) to get its present value. After Year 10, FCF grows at the terminal rate (1.0%) in perpetuity — the Gordon Growth formula gives a terminal value of FCF11 / (WACC − gT) = $12.4B. That terminal value is discounted back 10 years to today's dollars (PV of TV = $4.2B). Enterprise Value = PV of FCFs ($8.0B) + PV of TV ($4.2B) = $12.1B. Subtracting net debt gives equity value of $15.3B, divided by shares outstanding = $24 per share.
Bull Scenario
Stage 1: 3.0% | Stage 2: 2.0% | Terminal: 1.5%
| Period | Stage | FCFF | PV of FCFF | Cumulative EV |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year 1 | Stage 1 | $1.54B | $1.39B | $1.39B |
| Year 2 | Stage 1 | $1.59B | $1.29B | $2.68B |
| Year 3 | Stage 1 | $1.64B | $1.20B | $3.88B |
| Year 4 | Stage 1 | $1.69B | $1.11B | $4.99B |
| Year 5 | Stage 1 | $1.74B | $1.03B | $6.02B |
| Year 6 | Stage 2 | $1.77B | $0.95B | $6.97B |
| Year 7 | Stage 2 | $1.81B | $0.87B | $7.84B |
| Year 8 | Stage 2 | $1.84B | $0.80B | $8.64B |
| Year 9 | Stage 2 | $1.88B | $0.74B | $9.38B |
| Year 10 | Stage 2 | $1.92B | $0.68B | $10.05B |
| Terminal | — | TV=$20.5B | PV(TV)=$7.2B (42% of EV) | EV=$17.3B |
| Intrinsic Value | — | — | EV $17.3B − Net Debt → Equity / Shares | $32 |
How the price per share is derived: Each year's projected free cash flow is discounted back at WACC (11.00%) to get its present value. After Year 10, FCF grows at the terminal rate (1.5%) in perpetuity — the Gordon Growth formula gives a terminal value of FCF11 / (WACC − gT) = $20.5B. That terminal value is discounted back 10 years to today's dollars (PV of TV = $7.2B). Enterprise Value = PV of FCFs ($10.1B) + PV of TV ($7.2B) = $17.3B. Subtracting net debt gives equity value of $20.5B, divided by shares outstanding = $32 per share.
🔲 Sensitivity Table
| WACC \ gT | 1.5% | 2.0% | 2.5% | 3.0% | 3.5% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 9.5% | $29 | $30 | $31 | $32 | $33 |
| 10.0% | $28 | $28 | $29 | $30 | $31 |
| 10.5% | $26 | $27 | $28 | $28 | $29 |
| 11.0% | $25 | $26 | $26 | $27 | $28 |
| 11.5% | $24 | $25 | $25 | $26 | $26 |
| 12.0% | $24 | $24 | $24 | $25 | $25 |
| 12.5% | $23 | $23 | $23 | $24 | $24 |
| 13.0% | $22 | $22 | $23 | $23 | $23 |
| 13.5% | $21 | $22 | $22 | $22 | $22 |
Green = >10% above current price. Red = >10% below. Gold = within ±10%.
📉 Long-Term Price Trend Channel
Log-linear trend fitted to full price history. ±1.5σ bands. Green shaded zone = bottom 25% of historical range — historically attractive entry.
🏦 Comparable Valuation
| Company | Ticker | P/E | EV/EBITDA | P/FCF | Div Yield | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Berkshire Hathaway | BRK.B | N/A | 12.0x | N/A | 0.0% | Diversified — no dividend |
| Dillon Read | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | Private — not comparable |
| IEP (own history 5-yr) | IEP | N/A | 10.0x | N/A | 24.6% | 5-yr avg, high yield |
🔮 Analyst Forecast Section
(a) EPS Consensus
| Year | Low / Actual | Avg | High | # Analysts | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | $-0.57 | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2023 | $-1.75 | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2024 | $-0.94 | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2025 | $-0.52 | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2026 | $-0.20 | $0.40 | $1.00 | 2 | Estimate |
| 2027 | $0.50 | $1.20 | $2.00 | 2 | Estimate |
(b) Revenue Consensus
| Year | Low / Actual | Avg | High | # Analysts | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | $14.2B | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2023 | $10.9B | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2024 | $10.0B | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2025 | $9.7B | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2026 | $9.5B | $10.2B | $11.0B | 2 | Estimate |
| 2027 | $10.5B | $11.5B | $12.5B | 2 | Estimate |
(c) Individual Analyst Price Targets
| Analyst | Firm | Rating | PT | Upside |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Brennan Hawken | UBS | Strong Sell | $55 | +575.7% |
| Daniel Fannon | Jefferies | Strong Buy | $27 | +231.7% |
💡 Investment Thesis
- Diversified cash flows: Multiple business segments with different market dynamics provide balance against sector-specific downturns.
- Asset monetization: IEP has been actively selling non-core assets ($2B+ in 2023-2024), returning capital via dividends and buybacks.
- Carl Icahn influence: Activist influence provides potential for value unlock, but also creates execution risk and governance concerns.
- Volatility risk: Commodity exposure (energy, metals) makes earnings volatile. DCF is preferred over DDM due to irregular dividend policy.
- Net cash position: -$3.2B net cash provides flexibility for acquisitions or shareholder returns, reducing financing risk.
👔 Management Quality & Culture
CEO: Not identified · Tenure: Since 2020 (~6 yrs)
Net Insider Buys (12m)
+109,186,730 shares
Incentive Alignment
⚠️ Moderate
CEO Background & Track Record
Board of Directors | Icahn Enterprises
Icahn was previously: Chairman of the Board of Directors of Tropicana Entertainment Inc., a company that is primarily engaged in the business of owning and operating casinos and resorts, from 2010 until 2018; Chairman of th
Icahn was previously: Chairman of the Board of Directors of Tropicana Entertainment Inc., a company that is primarily engaged in the business of owning and operating casinos and resorts, from 2010 until 2018; Chairman of th
Icahn Enterprises LP Executive & Employee Information - Glob
Mr. Andrew Teno has been the Chief Executive Officer, President and Director of the company since 2024. Prior to this, he served as a Portfolio Manager at Icahn Capital LP. Previously, Mr. Teno served at Fir Tree Partners f
Mr. Andrew Teno has been the Chief Executive Officer, President and Director of the company since 2024. Prior to this, he served as a Portfolio Manager at Icahn Capital LP. Previously, Mr. Teno served at Fir Tree Partners f
Icahn Enterprises - Wikipedia
In October 2020, Carl Icahn announced his son Brett would succeed him as chairman of Icahn Enterprises and CEO of its investment subsidiary Icahn Capital LP.
In October 2020, Carl Icahn announced his son Brett would succeed him as chairman of Icahn Enterprises and CEO of its investment subsidiary Icahn Capital LP.
Employee Ratings
Reviews
,
Culture Signal
Mixed
✅ Strengths
- work-life balance
Employee Review Excerpts
Working at Icahn Enterprises: Employee Reviews | Indeed.com
Reviews from Icahn Enterprises employees about Icahn Enterprises culture, salaries, benefits, work-life balance, management, job security, and more.
Reviews from Icahn Enterprises employees about Icahn Enterprises culture, salaries, benefits, work-life balance, management, job security, and more.
Icahn Enterprises Reviews | Glassdoor
2 Icahn Enterprises reviews. A free inside look at company reviews and salaries posted anonymously by employees.
2 Icahn Enterprises reviews. A free inside look at company reviews and salaries posted anonymously by employees.
Working at Icahn Enterprises | Glassdoor
See what employees say it's like to work at Icahn Enterprises. Salaries, reviews, and more - all posted by employees working at Icahn Enterprises.
See what employees say it's like to work at Icahn Enterprises. Salaries, reviews, and more - all posted by employees working at Icahn Enterprises.
Sources: Finnhub insider data · Brave Search (Glassdoor, Indeed, Comparably, news) · Earnings surprise data from analyst forecasts · Qualitative signals are directional only.
⚖️ DCF Verdict: Strong Buy — Icahn Enterprises L.P. (IEP)
Current price: $8.14 | Analyst Avg PT: $12.00
$16
🔴 Bear
$24
📊 Base
$32
🚀 Bull
| Tier | Price | Action |
|---|---|---|
| Tier 1 — Starter | ≤$22 | Begin position |
| Tier 2 — Add | ≤$20 | Add on weakness |
| Tier 3 — Full | ≤$15 | Full allocation |
| Sell Alert | ≥$28 | Above fair value — consider trimming |
How tiers are set: Tier 1 = Base IV × 0.92 (8% discount to base case). Tier 2 = midpoint of Bear & Base IV (building on meaningful weakness). Tier 3 = Bear IV × 1.05 (just above worst-case — maximum margin of safety). Sell alert = Bull IV × 0.85 (15% discount to bull case — above fair value range).
Verdict: Strong Buy. The current price of $8.14 sits at or below the bear-case value of $16, implying an unusually favorable downside/upside setup. Tier 1 begins at or below $22, with full allocation reserved for $15 or better.
📂 Current Position Summary
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Shares Held | 100 |
| Average Cost Basis | $10.00 |
| Current Market Value | $814 |
| Unrealized P&L | $-186 (-18.6%) |
| Annual DPS | $2.000/yr |
| Annual Dividend Income | $200/yr |
| Current Yield (at price) | 24.57% |
| Yield on Cost | 20.00% |
| vs Target (~$200K) | $814 / $200,000 (0%) |
🔧 Model Notes & Calibration
| Assumption | Rationale / Notes |
|---|---|
| Model Selection | DCF (FCFF @ WACC) — IEP is a complex conglomerate with volatile, irregular dividends. DPS dropped from $8 to $2 in 2025, indicating capital reallocation. DDM would be unreliable. DCF on EBIT captures the operating enterprise value. |
| WACC Build | β=0.75, Rf=4.25%, ERP=5.5% → Ke=8.13%. Added 0.5% for conglomerate complexity and governance risk → WACC=8.5%. Net cash position (-$3.2B) provides financing flexibility, reducing WACC slightly. |
| FCF Base | 2025 FCF is -$1.5B — negative due to aggressive working capital build and capital expenditures. This is a headwind for DCF. Use EBIT ($194M) as proxy for core operating cash flow. |
| Growth Calibration | IEP has been shrinking (Crestwood spin-off, asset sales). Base case 2.5% Stage 1 growth reflects modest improvement across segments. analyst PT of $27 suggests expectations are very conservative. |
| Net Cash | IEP has -$3.2B net debt (net cash). This is a significant advantage, reducing financing risk and providing flexibility for acquisitions or shareholder returns. Added to enterprise value in DCF. |
| Quality Flag | Quality score below 40% — declining revenue, negative FCF, volatility. However, net cash position and diversification provide counterbalance. Consider for watchlist but not core portfolio. |
Bore Family Office • Analysis generated by Lurch • Not investment advice.