Bore Family Office
Valuation Report — Visa Inc. (V) • March 3, 2026
Unlevered DCF (FCFF @ WACC) • Discount Rate: 8.40% • Current Price: $320.83
Prepared by Lurch • Bore Family Office • Data: Finnhub, StockAnalysis.com, S&P Global Market Intelligence
🏢 Business Overview
Visa Inc. (NYSE: V) is the world's largest payment network, facilitating electronic payments between
consumers, merchants, financial institutions, and governments in over 200 countries. Founded in 1958
as BankAmericard (the first successful credit card program in the US), Visa pioneered the four-party
payment network model and went public in 2008 at $44/share — today trading at $320+ after a 7:1 return
in 18 years.
Business Model: Visa is a pure payment network — it does NOT lend money, issue cards,
or take credit risk. Banks issue Visa-branded cards; merchants accept them; Visa operates the network
that routes and authorizes the transaction in milliseconds. Visa earns a small fee (~0.1–0.15% of transaction
value) from both the issuing bank and the acquiring bank. This asset-light, zero-credit-risk model produces
extraordinary economics: 97.8% gross margins, 67% operating margins, 50%+ ROIC, and 54% FCF margins.
Revenue segments:
- Service Revenues (~60% of total): Fees based on gross payment volume processed
across the network. Driven by consumer spending growth + card penetration in emerging markets.
- Data Processing (~30%): Transaction authorization, clearing, settlement. Scales
with transaction count, not just dollar volume.
- International Transaction (~8%): Cross-border fees when cardholders transact outside
their home country — high-margin, growing segment (travel recovery).
- Value-Added Services (~5%): Fraud prevention (Visa Advanced Authorization),
tokenization, consulting for issuers/merchants. Fastest-growing segment at 20%+ annually.
Competitive moat: Visa's network is a classic two-sided platform with enormous scale
advantages. With 4.5 billion cards in circulation and acceptance at 150+ million merchant locations,
no competitor can replicate the ubiquity. Merchants accept Visa because consumers have Visa cards;
banks issue Visa cards because merchants accept them. This flywheel is nearly impossible to disrupt.
Visa processes 250 billion transactions annually — 50% more than Mastercard, 10× more than Amex.
📊 Financial Snapshot
| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|
| Revenue ($M) | $24,105 | $29,310 | $32,653 | $35,926 | $40,000 |
| EBITDA ($M) | $16,611 | $20,542 | $22,870 | $25,030 | $28,028 |
| Operating Income ($M) | $15,807 | $19,681 | $21,927 | $23,996 | $26,808 |
| Net Income ($M) | $12,311 | $14,957 | $17,273 | $19,743 | $20,058 |
| EPS (diluted) | $5.63 | $7.00 | $8.28 | $9.73 | $10.20 |
| Free Cash Flow ($M) | $14,522 | $17,879 | $19,696 | $18,693 | $21,577 |
| Annual DPS | $1.335 | $1.575 | $1.870 | $2.150 | $2.440 |
| Total Debt ($M) | $20,494 | $20,266 | $20,028 | $19,772 | $18,500 |
| Rev YoY Growth | — | +21.6% | +11.4% | +10.0% | +11.3% |
⚙️ WACC Build (DCF)
| Input | Value | Notes |
|---|
| Risk-Free Rate (Rf) | 4.30% | 10-yr US Treasury yield |
| Beta (β) | 0.780 | Market beta (Finnhub) |
| Equity Risk Premium (ERP) | 5.5% | Damodaran US ERP |
| Cost of Equity (Ke) | 8.60% | Ke = Rf + β × ERP |
| Pre-Tax Cost of Debt | 2.80% | Interest exp / gross debt |
| After-Tax Cost of Debt (Kd) | 2.30% | × (1 − 17%) |
| Weight Equity (We) | 97.1% | Mkt cap $0.0B |
| Weight Debt (Wd) | 2.9% | Gross debt $0.0B |
| WACC | 8.40% | DCF discount rate |
📈 DCF Scenarios


📋 Full 10-Year Projection Tables
Bear Scenario
| Period | Stage | FCFF | PV of FCFF | Cumulative EV |
|---|
| Year 1 | Stage 1 | $22.87B | $20.91B | $20.91B |
| Year 2 | Stage 1 | $24.24B | $20.26B | $41.16B |
| Year 3 | Stage 1 | $25.70B | $19.63B | $60.79B |
| Year 4 | Stage 1 | $27.24B | $19.02B | $79.81B |
| Year 5 | Stage 1 | $28.87B | $18.43B | $98.23B |
| Year 6 | Stage 2 | $30.17B | $17.60B | $115.83B |
| Year 7 | Stage 2 | $31.53B | $16.81B | $132.65B |
| Year 8 | Stage 2 | $32.95B | $16.06B | $148.71B |
| Year 9 | Stage 2 | $34.43B | $15.34B | $164.05B |
| Year 10 | Stage 2 | $35.98B | $14.65B | $178.70B |
| Terminal | — | TV=$534.5B | PV(TV)=$217.7B (55% of EV) | EV=$396.4B |
Base Scenario
| Period | Stage | FCFF | PV of FCFF | Cumulative EV |
|---|
| Year 1 | Stage 1 | $24.27B | $22.39B | $22.39B |
| Year 2 | Stage 1 | $27.31B | $23.24B | $45.63B |
| Year 3 | Stage 1 | $30.72B | $24.12B | $69.75B |
| Year 4 | Stage 1 | $34.56B | $25.03B | $94.78B |
| Year 5 | Stage 1 | $38.88B | $25.98B | $120.76B |
| Year 6 | Stage 2 | $41.99B | $25.88B | $146.64B |
| Year 7 | Stage 2 | $45.35B | $25.79B | $172.43B |
| Year 8 | Stage 2 | $48.98B | $25.69B | $198.12B |
| Year 9 | Stage 2 | $52.90B | $25.60B | $223.72B |
| Year 10 | Stage 2 | $57.13B | $25.50B | $249.22B |
| Terminal | — | TV=$1206.7B | PV(TV)=$538.7B (68% of EV) | EV=$787.9B |
Bull Scenario
| Period | Stage | FCFF | PV of FCFF | Cumulative EV |
|---|
| Year 1 | Stage 1 | $25.25B | $23.51B | $23.51B |
| Year 2 | Stage 1 | $29.54B | $25.61B | $49.11B |
| Year 3 | Stage 1 | $34.56B | $27.90B | $77.01B |
| Year 4 | Stage 1 | $40.43B | $30.39B | $107.40B |
| Year 5 | Stage 1 | $47.31B | $33.11B | $140.50B |
| Year 6 | Stage 2 | $52.51B | $34.22B | $174.72B |
| Year 7 | Stage 2 | $58.29B | $35.36B | $210.08B |
| Year 8 | Stage 2 | $64.70B | $36.55B | $246.63B |
| Year 9 | Stage 2 | $71.81B | $37.77B | $284.40B |
| Year 10 | Stage 2 | $79.71B | $39.04B | $323.44B |
| Terminal | — | TV=$2438.3B | PV(TV)=$1194.1B (79% of EV) | EV=$1517.6B |
🔲 Sensitivity Table
| WACC \ gT | 1.5% | 2.0% | 2.5% | 3.0% | 3.5% |
|---|
| 6.4% | $480 | $520 | $569 | $634 | $721 |
| 6.9% | $431 | $462 | $500 | $548 | $610 |
| 7.4% | $391 | $416 | $445 | $482 | $528 |
| 7.9% | $357 | $377 | $401 | $429 | $464 |
| 8.4% | $328 | $345 | $364 | $387 | $414 |
| 8.9% | $304 | $317 | $333 | $351 | $373 |
| 9.4% | $282 | $293 | $306 | $322 | $339 |
| 9.9% | $263 | $273 | $284 | $296 | $311 |
| 10.4% | $246 | $255 | $264 | $274 | $286 |
Green = >10% above current price. Red = >10% below. Gold = within ±10%.
🏦 Comparable Valuation
| Metric | V (current) | MA (Mastercard) | PYPL (PayPal) | V 5-yr Avg |
|---|
| P/E (NTM) | 24.5x | 31.2x | 18.4x | ~28x |
| EV/EBITDA | 21.8x | 25.3x | 12.1x | ~24x |
| P/FCF | 28.1x | 34.5x | 20.7x | ~31x |
| FCF Margin | 53.9% | 48.2% | 21.5% | ~55% |
| ROIC | ~48% | ~51% | ~14% | ~52% |
| Revenue Growth | +11.3% | +12.8% | +8.2% | ~12% |
| Dividend Yield | 0.8% | 0.6% | — | ~0.7% |
💰 Dividend / Distribution Analysis
| Metric | Value |
|---|
| Annual DPS | $2.520 |
| Current Yield | 0.79% |
| Consecutive Growth Years | 14 |
| 1-yr DPS CAGR | +13.5% |
| 3-yr DPS CAGR | +13.9% |
| 5-yr DPS CAGR | +14.5% |
| 10-yr DPS CAGR | +17.2% |
| Payout Ratio (DPS/EPS) | 23.7% |
| FCF Payout Ratio | 22.3% |
| Sustainability Verdict | ✅ Safe — best-in-class coverage |
Visa's dividend is extraordinarily well-covered — 24% payout ratio (EPS) and 22% FCF payout. The company generates ~$22B of annual free cash flow and returns only ~$5B as dividends, leaving massive room for buybacks ($14B+ in FY2025). The 14-year consecutive growth streak at 14.5% CAGR is sustainable indefinitely given the business model. Dividend is not at risk in any scenario. Visa prioritizes buybacks (reducing share count ~3%/yr) over aggressive dividend raises, which is shareholder-friendly given the high ROIC (50%+) on capital.

🔮 Analyst Forecast Section
(a) EPS Consensus
| Year | Low / Actual | Avg | High | # Analysts | Type |
|---|
| 2021 | $5.63 | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2022 | $7.00 | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2023 | $8.28 | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2024 | $9.73 | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2025 | $10.20 | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2026 | $12.20 | $13.09 | $13.95 | 43 | Estimate |
| 2027 | $13.60 | $14.81 | $16.20 | 42 | Estimate |
| 2028 | $15.20 | $16.75 | $18.50 | 32 | Estimate |
| 2029 | $16.90 | $18.90 | $21.10 | 22 | Estimate |
| 2030 | $18.80 | $21.20 | $24.00 | 15 | Estimate |
(b) Revenue Consensus
| Year | Low / Actual | Avg | High | # Analysts | Type |
|---|
| 2021 | $24.1B | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2022 | $29.3B | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2023 | $32.7B | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2024 | $35.9B | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2025 | $40.0B | — | — | — | Actual |
| 2026 | $43.5B | $45.5B | $47.8B | 43 | Estimate |
| 2027 | $47.8B | $50.2B | $52.9B | 42 | Estimate |
| 2028 | $52.3B | $55.4B | $58.7B | 32 | Estimate |
| 2029 | $57.0B | $60.8B | $64.9B | 22 | Estimate |
| 2030 | $61.9B | $66.5B | $71.4B | 15 | Estimate |
(c) Individual Analyst Price Targets
Consensus: Avg $399.71 | Range $330–$450
| Analyst | Firm | Rating | PT | Upside |
|---|
| James Faucette | Morgan Stanley | Overweight | $411 | +28.1% |
| Paul Golding | Macquarie | Outperform | $410 | +27.8% |
| Ramsey El-Assal | Cantor Fitzgerald | Overweight | $400 | +24.7% |
| Daniel R. Perlin | RBC Capital | Outperform | $395 | +23.1% |
| Mihir Bhatia | BofA Securities | Buy | $390 | +21.6% |
| Harshita Rawat | Bernstein | Outperform | $388 | +20.9% |
| Mikhail Paramonov | Freedom Capital | Buy | $375 | +16.9% |
| Darrin Peller | Wolfe Research | Outperform | $370 | +15.3% |
| Tien-Tsin Huang | JPMorgan | Overweight | $365 | +13.8% |
| Andrew Jeffrey | Truist Securities | Buy | $360 | +12.2% |
| Steven Kwok | Wells Fargo | Overweight | $355 | +10.7% |
| Timothy Chiodo | UBS | Buy | $350 | +9.1% |
| Kenneth Hill | Rosenblatt | Buy | $345 | +7.5% |
| Jason Kupferberg | BofA Securities | Neutral | $340 | +6.0% |
| David Togut | Evercore ISI | In Line | $330 | +2.9% |
(d) Earnings Surprise History
| Quarter | EPS Act vs Est | EPS Beat/Miss | Rev Act vs Est | Rev Beat/Miss | Guidance |
|---|
| Q1 FY2026 (Dec 25) | $2.96 vs $2.87 | +$0.09 ✅ | $10.5B vs $10.2B | +$0.2B ✅ | Raised FY2026 outlook |
| Q4 FY2025 (Sep 25) | $2.65 vs $2.58 | +$0.07 ✅ | $9.6B vs $9.5B | +$0.1B ✅ | Issued FY2026 guide |
| Q3 FY2025 (Jun 25) | $2.42 vs $2.38 | +$0.04 ✅ | $9.1B vs $9.0B | +$0.1B ✅ | Maintained outlook |
| Q2 FY2025 (Mar 25) | $2.51 vs $2.45 | +$0.06 ✅ | $8.8B vs $8.6B | +$0.2B ✅ | Raised revenue guide |
(e) Confidence Band Commentary
The analyst range is tight ($330–$450 = 36% spread) — consensus is strong. Visa has beaten EPS estimates in 4 consecutive quarters, typically by $0.04–$0.09. Revenue beats are consistent but modest (1–3% above estimates). Guidance raises are frequent, signaling management conservatism in initial targets. The FY2026 EPS jump (+28% vs FY2025) is attributed to volume recovery post-pandemic normalization, value-added services adoption, and share count reduction. High confidence in base case.


💡 Investment Thesis
Bull Case — What has to be true:
- Global cash-to-card conversion accelerates — emerging markets (India, Brazil, Southeast Asia)
adopt digital payments at 2× the current pace
- Cross-border travel remains strong — international transaction revenue (highest margin segment)
grows 15%+ annually through 2030
- Value-added services become 10%+ of revenue by 2028 (currently ~5%) — tokenization, real-time
payments, fraud AI tools drive margin expansion
- Buy Now Pay Later (BNPL) partnerships accelerate — Visa Installments gains share vs. Affirm/Klarna,
embedding Visa deeper into fintech ecosystems
- Buybacks continue at $14–16B/yr → share count declines 3–4% annually → EPS compounds at 15%+
Bear Case — Real risks:
- Interchange regulation: Durbin Amendment capped debit fees in 2011 (US only);
risk of similar credit card caps in US or EU would materially harm economics. Visa fought off EU
interchange caps in 2023 — vigilance required.
- Central bank digital currencies (CBDCs): If governments bypass card networks
with digital wallets (China's e-CNY is live; US/EU exploring), Visa's role shrinks. Current risk
is low (adoption glacial outside China) but structural threat over 10+ years.
- Real-time payment rails: FedNow (US), UPI (India), Pix (Brazil) enable instant
bank-to-bank transfers at zero/low cost. If merchants shift volume to these rails, Visa's transaction
count stagnates. Visa is responding by integrating with these networks (e.g., Visa Direct on UPI)
but margin pressure is real.
- Recession sensitivity: Consumer spending is cyclical. In a deep recession, payment
volume declines → Visa revenue falls (though fixed costs are low, so margins hold). Bear case assumes
2026–2027 global recession cuts volume growth to near-zero.
Base Case Assumptions:
- Payment volume grows 8–10% annually (mix of consumer spending +3–4%, card penetration +4–5%)
- Cross-border travel normalizes at pre-COVID levels; international transaction revenue grows
10–12%/yr through 2030
- Value-added services scale to $4B+ by 2028 (from ~$2B today) — 20% CAGR
- Margins remain stable at ~54% FCF margin (no material regulatory pressure pre-2030)
- Buybacks $14B/yr → share count declines 2.8–3.2%/yr → EPS grows 13–15%/yr
⚖️ DCF Verdict: Hold — Visa Inc. (V)
Current price: $320.83 | Analyst Avg PT: $399.71
| Tier | Price | Action |
|---|
| Tier 1 — Starter | ≤$300 | Begin position |
| Tier 2 — Add | ≤$280 | Add on weakness |
| Tier 3 — Full | ≤$260 | Full allocation |
| Sell Alert | ≥$450 | Above fair value — consider trimming |
Visa is trading at $321 — near the middle of its 52-week range ($299–$376) and below analyst consensus of $400. The DCF base case of ~$370–380 suggests fair value to modest upside at current levels, but not a compelling entry. The business quality is unquestionable — this is one of the best compounders in the world (15% EPS growth, 50%+ ROIC, zero credit risk). But at 24.5x NTM earnings, you're paying for that quality.
Entry strategy: Wait for a pullback to $300 or below (Starter). A 10% correction (to ~$290) would offer 30%+ upside to base case fair value — that's the entry you want. At $280 (Add tier), Visa becomes a strong buy. At current levels ($321), Hold unless you have no exposure to payment networks — in which case, a small starter position is defensible to establish the holding.
Catalyst watch: Q2 FY2026 earnings (late March 2026) — watch for cross-border volume growth and value-added services revenue acceleration. If VAS revenue hits $600M+ in the quarter (20%+ YoY growth), that's a re-rating catalyst toward $350–360.
Bore Family Office • Analysis generated by Lurch • Not investment advice.